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Non-technical summary: International studies based on the linked employer-employee data 
(e.g. Carrington and Troske 1998 Reilly and Wirjanto 1999a, Amuedo-Dorantes and De la 
Rica 2006) find that both men and women receive lower wage rates in firms with a high 
female proportion of the workforce. This study considers this topic for Germany. The study 
also addresses the possible reasons for a correlation between the proportion of women in 
establishments and the pay earned by women and men.  
The first hypothesis is that establishments with a high share of female employees offer 
attractive working conditions by, for example, reconciling the demands of work and family. 
On the basis of compensating wage differentials (Rosen 1986) the employees in such 
establishments tend to be paid lower wages.  
The second hypothesis is based on two assumptions: Women are less well qualified than men 
and establishments are heterogeneous in terms of the qualification requirements of their 
employees. It is therefore assumed that establishments seeking low qualified individuals show 
a high proportion of women in their workforce and pay lower wages. 
Another possible explanation discussed for the correlation between the proportion of women 
in establishments and the individual wage is the discrimination preference of the employer. In 
the framework of this third hypothesis, discriminatory employers are assumed to hire fewer 
women and to pay them lower wages, while men receive a preferential treatment and higher 
pay in such firms.  
These hypotheses are systematically examined in the empirical analysis. In addition to the 
proportion of women in the establishment, various individual and establishment 
characteristics are included successively in the regression analysis as determinants of wages. 
Individual qualifications and workplace characteristics can be controlled for by drawing on 
the extensive information provided by the LIAB data.  
The wage regressions – which, apart from the proportion of women in establishment 
workforces, only include human capital characteristics and occupation as explanatory 
variables – show different relationships for eastern and western Germany. In western 
Germany, the proportion of women in the workforce has a negative impact on the individual 
wages paid to men and women. In eastern Germany, in contrast, there appears to be no 
significant relationship between individual wages and the share of women in the workforce. If 
variables which describe workplace characteristics which appear to be particularly attractive 
for women are included, the impact of proportion of women in the firm workforce becomes 
less significant. Thus, there is empirical evidence that women themselves select firms which 
   
 
offer them an attractive working environment for which they are prepared to accept a 
reduction in pay. However, this effect is much weaker in eastern than in western Germany.  
The second hypothesis is confirmed in part. The proportion of women in an establishment 
would appear to reflect the lower qualifications of women employees. Less well-qualified 
men do not select employment into female dominated firms. Nonetheless, men in female-
dominated firms are less well paid than men working elsewhere.  
The discrimination preferences of employers cannot directly be observed. This means that the 
third hypothesis can only be tested indirectly. After controlling for individual qualifications 
and establishment characteristics, the proportion of women in an establishment is shown to 
have a negative impact on the pay of men and women, thus partly contradicting the 
discrimination hypothesis. 
   
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze: In internationalen Untersuchungen auf Basis von Linked Employer-
Employee Daten (z.B. Carrington und Troske 1998 Reilly und Wirjanto 1999a, Amuedo-
Dorantes und De la Rica 2006) wird festgestellt, dass sowohl Männer als auch Frauen in 
Betrieben mit einem vergleichsweise hohen Frauenanteil in der Belegschaft einen geringeren 
Lohn erhalten als Beschäftigte in männerdominierter Betrieben. Mit dieser Thematik auf 
Deutschland bezogen beschäftigt sich die vorliegende Studie. Darüber hinaus wird aber auch 
der Frage nachgegangen, welche Ursachen es für eine Korrelation zwischen dem Frauenanteil 
innerhalb von Unternehmen und den individuellen Löhnen von Frauen und Männern gibt.  
Die erste Hypothese basiert auf der Annahme, dass Betriebe mit einem hohen Frauenanteil 
gerade weiblichen Beschäftigten attraktive Arbeitsbedingungen bieten, indem sie 
beispielsweise die Vereinbarkeit von Beruf und Familie unterstützen. Auf Basis 
kompensierender Lohndifferentiale (vgl. Rosen 1986) erhalten die Beschäftigen in solchen 
Unternehmen einen tendenziell geringeren Lohn.  
Die zweite Hypothese basiert auf zwei Annahmen: Frauen sind weniger qualifiziert als 
Männer und Betriebe sind heterogen bzgl. der Qualifikationsanforderungen an ihre 
Beschäftigten. Es wird demzufolge vermutet, dass Firmen mit einem hohen Frauenanteil 
niedrig qualifizierte Beschäftigte nachfragen und sie infolgedessen geringer entlohnen. 
Als weitere mögliche Erklärung für die Korrelation zwischen dem Frauenanteil innerhalb von 
Betrieben und dem individuellen Lohn werden Diskriminierungspräferenzen von Seiten der 
Arbeitgeber diskutiert. Im Rahmen dieser Hypothese wird angenommen, dass 
diskriminierende Arbeitgeber weniger Frauen einstellen und diesen einen geringeren Lohn 
zahlen, während Männer in solchen Firmen bevorzugt eingestellt werden und einen höheren 
Lohn enthalten.   
In der empirischen Analyse werden die aufgestellten Hypothesen systematisch überprüft. 
Dabei werden sukzessive verschiedene individuelle und firmenspezifische Merkmale neben 
dem Frauenanteil innerhalb von Betrieben als Lohndeterminanten in der Regressionsanalyse 
aufgenommen. Die umfangreichen Informationen der LIAB-Daten ermöglichen es, für die 
individuelle Qualifikation und Arbeitsplatzcharakterisitika zu kontrollieren.  
In die Lohnregressionen, in die neben dem Frauenanteil innerhalb von Firmen nur 
individuelle Humankapitalmerkmale und der Beruf als erklärende Variable aufgenommen 
werden, zeigen sich für Ost- und Westdeutschland unterschiedliche Zusammenhänge. In 
Westdeutschland ergibt sich ein negativer Effekt des Frauenanteils auf den individuellen Lohn 
bei Männern und Frauen. In Ostdeutschland hingegen zeigt sich zunächst kein signifikanter 
Zusammenhang zwischen dem individuellen Lohn und dem Frauenanteil. Bei der Aufnahme 
   
 
von Variablen, die Arbeitsplatzmerkmale beschreiben, die besonders attraktiv für Frauen 
erscheinen, sinkt der Einfluss des Frauenanteils innerhalb von Firmen. Damit zeigt sich 
empirische Evidenz dafür, dass sich Frauen in Firmen selektieren, die eine für sie angenehme 
Arbeitsumgebung schaffen und für die sie bereit sind, Lohnabschläge in Kauf zu nehmen. In 
Ostdeutschland ist dieser Effekt allerdings weit aus schwächer als in Westdeutschland.  
Die zweite Hypothese wird zum Teil bestätigt. Anscheinend reflektiert der Frauenanteil 
innerhalb von Firmen die geringere Qualifikation von weiblichen Beschäftigten. Gering 
qualifizierte Männer selektieren sich nicht in frauendominierte Firmen. Trotzdem werden 
Männer in frauendominierten Firmen geringer entlohnt als Männer in nicht frauendominierten 
Firmen.  
Diskriminierungspräferenzen von Arbeitgebern können nicht beobachtet werden. Daher kann 
die dritte Hypothese nur indirekt getestet werden. Nachdem für individuelle Qualifikation und 
Firmenmerkmale kontrolliert wird, zeigt sich sowohl für Männer als auch für Frauen, dass der 
Effekt des Frauenanteils innerhalb von Firmen auf den Lohn negativ ist. Die dritte Hypothese 
wird somit durch diese empirische Studie nicht unterstützt. 
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1 Introduction  
The fact that women earn lower wages than men has been documented in many studies for 
several countries and periods of time. One important result of this research is that there is a 
relationship between the wages of men and women and the gender composition of 
occupations, industries and firms1. Such evidence helps to understand the source of gender 
differences and could potentially increase the effectiveness of policies that aim to reduce the 
gender wage gap.  
Most segregation research has focused on the impact of occupational segregation of men and 
women on the gender wage gap (e.g. Macpherson and Hirsch 1995) and the effect of 
industry segregation (e.g. Fields and Wolff 1995). The empirical studies show that individual 
wages vary systematically according to the gender composition of occupations and 
industries. More precisely, an increasing proportion of women has a detrimental effect upon 
the wages of men and women. 
The relationship between wages and sex segregation at establishment level has been studied 
less in empirical analysis.2 The first studies (McNulty 1967, Buckley 1971, Blau 1977) 
found that women were more likely to work in lower paying firms than men. More recent 
investigations (e.g. Carrington and Troske 1998, Reilly and Wirjanto 1999a, Bayard et al. 
2003, Vieira et al. 2005, Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica 2006) support this result and 
demonstrate that the individual wages of men and women decrease as the proportion of 
women within an establishment increases.  
However, most empirical studies do not sufficiently scrutinize the measured impact of the 
proportion of females within establishments on individual wages. For this reason, I shall 
attempt to go one step further in my analysis. Why should sex segregation at establishment 
level impact upon individual earnings? I examine three hypotheses. Firstly, by assuming 
gender differences in the preferences for specific establishment and workplace 
characteristics, the proportion of females in an establishment may reflect the attractiveness 
of a specific workplace environment for women, creating an environment in return for which 
they are willing to accept lower wages. Secondly, I examine the so-called quality sorting 
hypothesis, which considers the proportion of females within an establishment as a proxy for 
the skill requirements of the employer. The main assumptions are that skill requirements 
 
1 In the study the terms firm and establishment are used synonymously.  
2 One reason is the lack of micro-data with information on both the employers and employees. Indeed, the 
availability of linked employer-employee data in the last decade has generated many studies which highlights 
firm aspects. For a survey of linked employer-employee data see e.g. Abowd and Kramarz (1999) 
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vary from establishment to establishment and that men and women have different skill 
endowments, with the latter being less well-qualified. Finally, another possible explanation 
for a connection between the proportion of females within establishments and individual 
wages could be discriminatory preferences among employers against women. In this study, I 
investigate the direction of the relationship between the proportion of females within 
establishments and the wages of male and female employees by specifying various wage 
equations for both western and eastern Germany. For this purpose, I use a rich linked 
employer-employee data set maintained by the Research Data Centre of the Federal 
Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research in Germany. This data set is 
rich in terms of information on important productivity-related characteristics (e.g. education 
and tenure) and very detailed information on establishment characteristics (e.g. employment 
number, collective bargaining and industry). A further strength of this data is that the 
available number of observations is very large3, making it possible to obtain reliable 
estimates for the parameters of interest. 
By means of this analysis, I attempt to investigate why sex segregation affects individual 
earnings. Such an improved understanding is important for designing adequate policies. If 
the reason for a negative relationship between the proportion of females and individual wage 
rates arises from the choice of women to work for firms that provide an attractive working 
environment for them, such policies will differ from policies aiming at reducing 
discrimination against women. In the latter case, one can initiate the discussion about 
affirmative action or employment equity programs to address issues of imbalance in the sex 
composition of establishments. If the impact of the proportion of females within 
establishments on individual wages is due to self-selection of women in certain firms, then 
there is no need for direct political intervention at firm level. If the relationship between the 
proportion of females within an establishment and the level of wages paid can be attributed 
to lower qualifications among women, then policies should aim to improve qualifications 
among women.  
In this study, I will not address occupational segregation even though occupation is a very 
interesting dimension. Occupational segregation is more constant over time than segregation 
at firm level because occupational changes occur less often. Nonetheless, I refrain from 
including occupational segregation as many empirical studies measuring the impact of 
 
3 The data set contains a representative sample of German establishments with at least one employee covered by 
the German social security system and all employees in these establishments who pay social security 
contributions.  
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occupational segregation on wages have already been conducted. For instance, Achatz et al. 
(2005) as well as Jurajda and Harmgart (2007) have investigated this issue as it affects 
Germany.  
The study will then develop thus. In the following section, I present a brief review of the 
empirical literature that investigates the relationship between the gender composition in 
establishments and individual wages. In Section 3, I formulate hypotheses that seek to 
explain the relationship between sex segregation and the wages of women and men. In 
Section 4, I describe the empirical methodology that I employ to gauge this relationship. In 
the subsequent section, I introduce the data set and provide descriptive statistics of the 
characteristics. The results of the estimations are presented in Section 6. The Section 7 
provides a conclusion.  
2 Previous empirical literature 
In this section I will summarize the results of previous empirical studies that analyze the 
association between the proportion of females in establishments and wages. I will focus on 
studies that use establishment level data.4  
The first empirical studies investigating earnings and gender segregation at establishment 
level emerged in the seventies. McNulty (1967) and Buckley (1971) indicate that inter-firm 
gender segregation is an important factor for determining different earnings of male and 
female employees. Both studies point out that men tend to work in high-wage establishments 
and women in low-paying establishments. Using the same data set for the US they compare 
average wages of male and female employees between integrated and single-sex 
establishments by occupations. The comparison reveals that men’s earnings exceed those of 
women in the same occupations but these differences are smaller in establishments 
employing both sexes. However, the descriptive results are derived from selected 
occupational earnings and establishments. Blau (1977) also considers selected occupational 
groups in three metropolitan statistical area but she exploit the information to the accurate 
proportion of female employees within firms. She computes the correlation between the 
ranking of firms with respect to both wages and the proportion of female employees. This 
ranking is based on coefficients associated with firm dummies in two separate regressions on 
wages and the proportion of female employees, respectively. The negative estimated 
correlation coefficient suggests that females are highly presented in the workforce in firms 
 
4 c. f. Foguel (2004) 
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which pay lower wages to both sexes, while males comprise a higher proportion of 
employees in those firms which pay higher wages.   
Groshen (1991a) extends the work of Blau (1977) by jointly estimating the effects of 
segregation by occupation, establishment and job-cells5 on the wages of workers within five 
industries in the US. Her results show a negative relationship between gender segregation at 
establishment level and individual wages in all five industries. Furthermore, it seems that in 
some industries gender segregation at establishment level explained the gender wage gap for 
the most part, while in other industries occupational segregation is more important in 
determining the gap. The used data set, however, does not include further information on 
employees and establishments. Hence, typical wage determinants such as education and 
experience are not taken into account, which are presumably important controls in gender 
wage regressions.  
Carrington and Troske (1995) study the establishment gender segregation in small U.S. 
firms. In an establishment level regression they estimate the impact of the proportion of 
women on the average wage within an establishment (wage bill per employee).  The 
estimates reveal that firms with a predominantly male workforce tend to pay higher average 
wages than firms where women account for the majority of the workforce. In a follow-up 
study Carrington and Troske (1998) improve their previous work by using individual worker 
information from a small sample of linked employer-employee data. In a pooled wage 
equation for male and female employees they control for various worker and establishment 
characteristics and use an interaction term between the female dummy and the proportion of 
women within an establishment variable to ascertain the impact of gender segregation on 
female and male wages. The basic findings are that both men and women earn less in firms 
that are predominantly staffed by women, but that the negative effects experienced by 
women are greater.  
Bayard et al. (2003) attempt to review the results of Groshen (1991a) by a using 
comprehensive matched employer-employee data set which covers all industries and 
occupations across all regions in the US. They also find negative effects arising from the 
proportion of females within an establishment on wages for both sexes. This negative impact 
is again greater for women. Their results also indicate that, even though a sizeable part of the 
gender wage gap can be explained by the segregation of females into lower-paying 
occupations, industries, establishments and job cells, a considerable part of the gap remains 
unexplained. These findings differ from other research, most notably that of Groshen 
 
5 Job-cells mean the interaction between occupations and establishments. 
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(1991a). The authors attribute the deviations to the larger data set and to the inclusion of 
some controls for individual characteristics and industry dummies in separate regressions for 
men and women. 
The European studies conducted by Datta Gupta and Rothstein (2005) as well as Amuedo-
Dorantes and De la Rica (2006) are similar to those of Groshen (1991a) and Bayard et al. 
(2003). Datta Gupta and Rothstein (2005) use matched employer-employee data from 
Denmark to investigate how gender segregation affects the gender wage gap, while Amuedo-
Dorantes and De la Rica (2006) focus on Spain. Both analyses estimate pooled (by gender) 
wage equations that include the proportion of females in industry, occupation, establishment 
and job-cell. The relationship between the proportion of females within firms and individual 
wages is negative. In addition, in separate wage regressions by gender, Amuedo-Dorantes 
and De la Rica (2006) find that being employed in a predominantly female establishment has 
a negligible impact on men’s wages, whereas it significantly reduces female wages. In both 
studies the authors focus on the effect of segregation on the wage gap (rather than on 
individual earnings) and find that there is a significant within-job-cell gender wage 
differential. 
Reilly and Wirjanto (1999a) investigate the relationship between wages and gender 
segregation for Canada with a small sample of matched employer-employee data. In a 
Generalised Least Squares (GLS) regression framework they find that the proportion of 
women in an establishment has a negative impact on individual wages for both men and 
women. Again the negative effect on the female wages is more pronounced than on male 
wages.  
Vieira et al. (2005) study gender segregation at the establishment level over fifteen years in 
Portugal, and its impact on wages and the gender wage gap by using a large matched 
employer-employee data set. This is the only study that finds a negative effect arising from 
the proportion of women within firms on women’s wages and, on the contrary, a positive 
effect on men’s wages.  
In an empirical analysis, Achatz et al. (2005) use one wave (from the year 2000) of a 
German linked employer-employee data set (the LIAB data) to investigate the impact of the 
proportion of females within job-cells on individual wages in western Germany. Like most 
other studies, they find that the negative relationship is more pronounced for women. They 
conclude that discrimination occurs particularly through a gender-based assignment of jobs.   
In summary, previous empirical studies lead one to conclude that working in establishments 
with a predominantly female workforce reduces wages for both sexes, with this effect being 
 6
 
                                                
  
more pronounced for women. Despite a consensus regarding these stylized facts, the 
magnitude and interpretation of the relationship between wages and gender composition 
remain unclear.6  In this study, I attempt to investigate the relationship between the 
proportion of females within establishments and individual wages by including individual 
characteristics such as experience, education and occupation as well as standard firm-
specific variables such as establishment size and type of industry. In an extension to previous 
studies, I attempt to control for further establishment characteristics by exploiting the rich 
firm-side of my data set. If firm characteristics are important, including them should reduce 
the impact of the proportion of females within establishments on individual wages. In this 
way, I seek to understand what is measured by the impact of the proportion of females on 
individual wages.  
3 Theoretical framework 
In this section I present three hypotheses which deal with the gender wage gap and sex 
segregation at establishment level. I begin by reviewing the hypothesis that gender 
differences in wages and employment patterns are the consequence of preferences. I then go 
on to formulate a second hypothesis that is based on skill differences between men and 
women. I then present a third hypothesis that explains the relationship between the 
proportion of females within firms and wages by assuming that discriminatory attitudes are 
adopted by employers against women. 
 
3.1  Preference hypothesis 
The role of differences in preferences is often emphasized in the discussion of gendered 
labor market outcomes. Men and women are assumed to differ in their preferences for 
market versus non-market work or leisure as well as for particular types of work, such as 
manual labor versus office work.7 The distribution of preferences for particular job attributes 
among men and women and the costs to employers of offering jobs with particular 
characteristics will affect the wage distribution. For instance, the theory of compensating 
differentials (Rosen 1986) predicts that if differences in job characteristics, such as inflexible 
 
6 Some studies hastily explain the negative impact by discrimination.  
7 Related to the topic is the question concerning the source of gender differences in preferences (see Altonji and 
Blank 1999). There is only little direct evidence concerning the question how and why preferences might 
develop over time. For instance, the differential treatment of boys versus girls in the family or in the educational 
system may be one source of differences in preferences. However, regardless of the source, in a competitive 
labor market gender differences in preferences can imply gender differences in labor force participation, in 
workplaces and in wages.  
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work schedules or shift work, are associated with a disutility, then such jobs will offer a 
wage premium. The theory further predicts that those workers with a relatively high 
tolerance for such disamenities will naturally gravitate towards these jobs. If workers with 
these preferences are also predominantly males, then such jobs will be largely filled by men. 
The argumentation of the theory of compensating differentials can be used to explain the 
negative correlation between the proportion of females within firms and the wages of both 
males and females. Firms differ regarding the technologies used in production, the 
institutional background, the profit situation and so on. Hence, they offer jobs with different 
characteristics. On the other hand, there are certain job characteristics which are typically 
favored by women and which are connected to lower wage rates. These are mainly job 
characteristics which improve the work-life balance as the major burden of family work is 
still borne by women. These attributes are, for instance, flexible working time, less overtime, 
a firm kindergarten or crèche, or special mentoring programs for female employees. The 
workplace attributes are connected with costs for the employers and thus lead to a wage 
reduction, which is likely to be accepted by those individuals with a greater preference for 
these workplace amenities8. Based on the assumption that women have a greater preference 
for these characteristics, firms offering these attributes will be particularly attractive for 
women. This results in a larger proportion of female employees than in establishments not 
offering such benefits. These considerations show that if one does not control for an 
attractive working environment in a wage regression analysis, the impact of the proportion 
of females in establishments on wages is likely to reflect part of the negative correlation 
between certain job characteristics and individual wages. This also holds true for men: Men 
choosing to work for firms with a predominately female workforce also seems to be willing 
to accept lower wages for job characteristics such as flexible working hours. 
Reilly and Wirjanto (1999b) argue in a similar manner. In their study they employ the 
expression “coincidence of needs”. They argue that firms with a high proportion of females 
offer employment contracts to employees that fit the employment pattern preferred by 
women. Worker and employers have preferences, technological choices, and constraints that 
have to correspond. A successful job match is thus a coincidence of needs. That implies the 
sorting of women into specific establishments. The resulting (compensating) wage 
differential reflects the mutually advantageous trade between employers and employees. 
 
 
8 The costs are partly transferred from employers to employees and the resulting wage reduction depends on the 
bargaining power of employees and employers. 
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3.2 Qualification hypothesis 
The second hypothesis dealing with the relationship between individual wages and sex 
segregation at establishment level is related to the so-called quality sorting hypothesis, which 
finds frequent mention in the literature (see e.g. Macpherson and Hirsch 1995, Carrington 
and Troske 1998, Reilly and Wirjanto 1999a). The idea is simple and based on two premises. 
The first is that firms are heterogeneous in terms of the skill demands on employees. Some 
establishments need many highly qualified workers for their production. These would 
include such establishments as research establishments. Other firms, for example cleaning 
companies, demand low skilled workers. The second premise is that women and men have 
different skill levels, with the former group being less qualified. The lower qualification of 
women is often explained by the human capital model (e.g. Mincer and Polachek 1974). This 
model departs from the traditional gender division of labor within families under which 
women are expected to have a shorter and more intermittent attachment to the labor market 
than men. This implies, ceteris paribus, that the net return on pre-labor market investments in 
human capital for women will be lower than that for men. Similarly, the shorter and more 
discontinuous labor force participation of women reduces the long-run pay-off on 
investments in general and firm-specific training. Thus, given their shorter expected working 
life, women’s optimal response is to acquire a lower amount of human capital in terms of 
training and labor market experience. Polachek (1981) also argued that women invest rather 
in human capital and favor occupations with lower rates of depreciations for periods of 
absence from the labor force.       
The result of the two premises is that firms requiring relatively more unskilled (skilled) labor 
will have a higher (lower) concentration of females and pay lower (higher) wages. 
According to the quality sorting hypothesis, male employees in firms with a predominantly 
female workforce are also less well-qualified than men in other firms. Thus, in the quality 
sorting hypothesis the gender composition of a firm serves as an index of labor quality. This 
hypothesis therefore predicts that wages of men and women are negatively correlated with 
the proportion of females in the establishment if one does not control for productivity.  
Note that in the quality sorting hypothesis mentioned in literature (see e.g. Hirsch and 
Schumacher 1992, Macpherson and Hirsch 1995, Hirsch and Macpherson 2004)9, the 
proportion of female employees is assumed to be correlated to both measured and 
unmeasured labor productivity differences. Here, I can only control for observed 
 
9 However, the first two mentioned studies investigate wages and racial composition.   
characteristics. To the extent that measurable and immeasurable labor quality factors are 
positively correlated, this may partly cover unobserved differences.        
 
3.3 Discrimination hypothesis 
The third hypothesis is framed by the Becker (1971) model of employer discrimination. I 
shall explain this model in more detail since it is less straightforward than the two 
hypotheses already dealt with. Following this model, a wage-taking firm with a production 
function f  uses two inputs: the labor of men, M , and labor of women, , which are 
perfect substitutes
F
10. Employers have a dislike of hiring female workers, and do not 
maximize profits but rather maximize utility, defined as 
( ) ( ) ( ), , M FU M F Y M F w M w F F M= + − − ⋅d−π                            (1)  
where  is the discrimination coefficient representing this dislike, d Mw  and  are the 
market wages of men and women respectively.
Fw
11 Short-run utility maximization then implies 
( )2 ,    .M M F FMP d F M w MP d M w+ = − =                                       (2) 
The marginal product of male labor MMP  is below its input price Mw , because male labor 
increases the employer’s utility, the marginal product of female labor FMP  is discounted by 
the non-pecuniary cost of discrimination to the employer and hence is above the input price 
of female labor . The discrimination coefficient d  will lead the firm in the short run to 
hire fewer women and more men than profit maximization would dictate.
Fw
12 The degree of 
aversion to hiring female employees is assumed to vary across employers. Firms with 
weaker discriminatory preferences (smaller ) will tend to hire relatively more women and 
relatively fewer men, and vice versa. Thus, preferences provide the exogenous source of 
variation in the proportion of females across otherwise identical firms. However, in the 
Becker model the firms are price-takers, so the wages for male and female employees do not 
vary across firms. Another drawback of the model is that employer discrimination cannot 
persist under perfect competition without productivity differences between male and female 
d
                                                 
10 Perfect substitutes imply that male and female employees have the same marginal product of labor, 
M M FP MP=  
 
11 The output price is standardized to 1.  
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12 Arrow (1973) formulated it in this way. In the original model d simply multiplies F in the employer’s utility 
function, which generates complete sex segregation across the board with the exception of the marginal 
employer. The utility function based on the relative number of female employees leads to an equilibrium less at 
odds with observed employment patterns.  
employees. Firms which have no aversion to hiring women pay wages according to their 
marginal productivity and force the discriminatory firms out of the market. Thus the 
assumption of perfect competition is relaxed towards that firms have monopsony power. 
The new monopsony literature emphasizes that monopsony power may even occur if there 
are many employers competing for employees, and not only in the case of one single 
employer (see for a systematic presentation of this literature Manning 2003). Models of new 
monopsony literature ascribe upward-sloping firm level labor supply curves13 to mobility 
costs, search frictions and heterogeneous preferences among employees.14 Discrimination 
against women in a situation of such imperfect competition results in lower wages and a 
reduced level of employment for women. In order to demonstrate this, it is supposed that the 
firm level labor supply curve of men and women is equal to .( ),  ,s gL w g M F= 15 The male 
and female employees are perfect substitutes in production. If the employer dislikes 
employing women, the utility function16 has the following form: 
  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).s s s s sM F M M F MU Y L w L w w L w w L w dL w= + − − − F                (3) 
By differentiating equation (3) with respect to Mw  and , the optimal wage rates for men 
and woman can be obtained. They are as follows: 
Fw
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ε= + d−                                                                 (4) 
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0         if 
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ε > =⎧= = ⎨ F=⎩  
where  denotes the elasticity of the labor supply and lies between 0 and 1, ( )wε *gw  is the 
wage for male and female employees, ,g M F= , given the labor supply curve. If the 
                                                 
13 The analyses of job-to-job flows within a search framework by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Manning 
(1994) have established the idea that each single firm or establishment faces its own individual labor supply 
curve. The point is that workers quit endogenously, and have to be replaced by new hires. The higher the wage, 
the lower the number quitting and thus the easier it is to attract replacement hires.   
14 Bergmann (1974) argued in a related way in her “overcrowding” model. She acts on the assumption that men 
and women are segregated into two occupations. Furthermore, it is assumed that there is no mobility of labor 
between occupations. Hence, if the job opportunities for women are small relative to their labor supply, women 
will “crowd” to work in one occupation. This depresses the wage there. This results in a gender wage 
differential. The argumentation is often mentioned in studies dealing with occupational segregation. However, 
the segregation is exogenously given in that model framework. 
15 I suppress the firm subscript. 
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16 Note, for simplification I return to the original formulation of the Becker model assuming that the utility 
negatively depends on the number of the hired women instead of the relative number. Using the relative number 
of female employees would unnecessarily complicate the analysis. Then the derivations of the utility regarding 
the male and female wages would also depend on the labor supply of the other gender. Thus I cannot formulate a 
clear relationship as an equation (4). 
second-order condition is satisfied, ( )2'' 2 ' 0s sL L− < , and one can see that women obtain a 
lower wage than male employees. Wages and employment therefore are both lower for 
women. This result would be even stronger if one assumes that the female labor supply is 
more inelastic than its male counterpart.17  
Thus the preference-based discrimination model predicts that the proportion of female 
employees varies across firm depending on the degree of discriminatory behavior: the less 
(more) discriminatory the employer is, the higher (lower) the proportion of women in the 
firm. In addition, the monopson model framework allows employers a wage setting policy 
according to the firm-specific elasticity of labor supply and to the extent of aversion to 
employing women. Ceteris paribus, the wage rate of female employees decreases with the 
degree of discrimination. Thus, supposing the same wage elasticities for male and female 
employees, the formulated discrimination hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between 
wage rates of female employees and the proportion of women within an establishment when 
the latter is a proxy for the disinclination to employ women. In contrast to this, the 
hypothesis predicts a negative relationship for male employees. This directly results from the 
upward-sloping labor supply, predicting a lower employment level for the group that 
receives a lower wage. 
Note, in this hypothesis I use the preference-based discrimination model according to Becker 
(1971) and Arrow (1973) respectively. This model is embedded in a monopsony framework 
to derive a relationship between individual wages and the proportion of females which varies 
across establishments.  
To sum up, the first two hypotheses, the preference and qualification hypotheses, both 
predict a negative relationship between the proportion of females within establishments and 
individual wages for both male and female employees. The discrimination hypothesis 
predicts a positive relationship between the proportion of females and wages for women and 
a negative relationship for men. 
In the empirical analysis I want to investigate what drives the impact of the proportion of 
females within establishments on individual wages. By successively including productivity-
related characteristics and variables describing the workplace I extract the impact of those 
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17 This is the idea of monopsonistic discrimination in the labor market developed by Robinson (1933). In this 
model it is assumed that the female labor supply is more inelastic than the male labor supply. Thus women will 
earn less than men relative to their productivity, and thus face a higher level of exploitation in the labor market. 
In this model framework the existence of gender pay gap can be explained by difference in labor supply between 
men and women even if employers have no discrimination preferences. Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) and Hirsch 
et al. (2006) empirically support the idea that female labor supply to the firm is less elastic than male labor 
supply. 
variables from the effect of the proportion of females. Thus I can directly test my first two 
hypotheses. 
Unfortunately I cannot directly test the discrimination hypothesis because I cannot observe 
the discriminatory behavior of employers. However, if I can rule out that the proportion of 
females reflects preferences and productivity differences, the explanation is likely to be 
discrimination. Thus I can indirectly test the discrimination hypothesis by controlling for 
productivity-related characteristics and variables describing the workplace. I check whether 
the remaining effect of the proportion of females on wages is in accordance with the 
predicted relationship in the discrimination hypothesis.     
4 Empirical methodology 
In order to analyze the effect of the proportion of females within an establishment on the 
wages of individuals I consider a standard censored Tobit model since the dependent 
variable is censored from above in the used data set (see next section): 
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where superscript ( ),g m f=  indicates the gender, gijw  describes the observed log wage of 
worker  in establishment i j , gijw
∗  refers to the actual log wage, gijX  denotes a various set of 
individual and job related characteristics dependent of the specification, gjφ  presents the 
proportion of females in the establishment. Furthermore gβ  and gγ  are the corresponding 
regression coefficients, gijε  is an error term and gjσ  is the establishment-specific variance of 
these. The right-censoring of the dependent variable can be dealt with by estimating a Tobit 
model, where the distribution of the log wage rate is censored from above at the point c (the 
daily social security threshold). 
I estimate the Tobit model (5) with robust parameter standard errors based on clusters at the 
establishment level. As I mentioned above, I use matched employer-employee data. For each 
establishment I observe wage rates of almost all employees.18 The standard regression 
assumption is that what is not known about the determination of wages is distributed 
                                                 
  
18 I do not observe all workers because the data set includes only employees which are covered by the social 
security system (see next section). I also do not use all observable wage rates because of my sample selection. In 
the next section I describe these details.  
independently across all observations. This is an extremely strong assumption for this type 
of data. It is not reasonable to assume that establishments will set an individual’s wage 
independently relative to other individuals in the firm. For instance, establishments might 
use internal labor markets to determine wages. This and other possible arguments suggest a 
non-independence of wage equation error terms for individuals who work in the same 
establishment.  
This is the reason for using robust standard errors based on clusters at establishment level. I 
assume the following structure for the covariance of the errors: 
2
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                                      (6) 
5 Data 
In the empirical analysis I use data from the IAB Linked Employer-Employee panel (LIAB) 
which combines data from the IAB Establishment Panel and the Employment Statistics 
Register. 
The IAB Establishment Panel is an annual survey of German establishments, which started 
in western Germany in 1993 and was extended to eastern Germany in 1996.19 The sample of 
selected establishments is random and stratified by industries, establishment size 
classifications and regions. The sample unit is the establishment as the local business unit. 
The establishments asked in the survey are selected from the parent sample of all German 
establishments that employ at least one employee covered by social security. Thus, the self-
employed and establishments employing only people not covered by social security 
(mineworkers, farmers, artists, journalists, etc.) as well as the public sector employing 
exclusively civil servants do not belong to the original sample. The data set is a 
representative sample of German establishments employing at least one employee who pays 
social security contributions. The establishments covered by the survey have been 
questioned every year about turnover, number of employees, composition of the workforce, 
personnel problems, industrial relations, wage policies, investments, innovations and 
business strategies.  
The worker information comes from the Employment Statistics Register. This is an 
administrative panel data set of all employees in Germany paying social security 
   13
 
                                                 
19 Detailed information on the IAB Establishment Panel is given by Kölling (2000). 
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contributions.20 The data is based on notifications which employers are obliged to provide 
for each employee covered by the German social security system. According to the statutory 
provisions, employers have to report information for all employed contributors at the 
beginning and end of their employment spell. In addition an annual report for each employee 
is compulsory at the end of the year. This report contains information on an employee’s 
occupation, the occupational status, qualification, sex, age, nationality and industry. Also the 
available information on daily gross earnings refers to employment spell that employers 
report to the Federal Employment Service.21 If the wage rate exceeds the social security 
threshold (“Beitragsbemessungsgrenze”), the daily social security threshold is reported 
instead. Note that the daily wage rate is therefore censored from above – mostly relevant for 
men.  
Both data sets contain a unique establishment identifier which is used to match information 
on all employees paying social security contributions with the establishment in the IAB 
Establishment Panel. 
I construct my sample in two steps. First I select establishments from the IAB Establishment 
Panel data set. I use the wave 2002 because it includes very interesting information 
describing the workplace. As mentioned in Section 3, the theoretical approaches are based 
on the profit-maximizing behavior of establishments. For this reason, I exclude observations 
corresponding to non-profit establishments, including the public sector. Since I implement 
separate analyses for eastern and western Germany I also construct separate data sets, 
whereby the location of the establishment determines the assignment. 
In the second step, I merge the establishment data with notifications for all employees 
employed by selected establishments in the year 2002. From the worker data I drop 
observations for apprentices, part-time workers and home workers. I consider only full-time 
workers because the Employment Statistics Register lacks explicit information on hours 
worked.22 To avoid modeling human capital formation and retirement decisions, I focus on 
individuals aged between 25 and 55 years. Some individuals in the data set have more than 
one job at the same time. Furthermore I select the observations that correspond to the main 
job of the individual to avoid that estimation with information on secondary labor market 
activities and notification errors are contaminated.   
 
20 Information on the Employment Statistics Register is given by Bender et al. (2000). 
21 To deal with the problem of overlapping spells, I apply a hierarchical order of activities where employment 
trumps all other activities.  
22 However, I have in mind that the meaning of my results is limited to full-time employed males and females 
although a lot of women work part-time.  
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The final western German sample comprises 757,914 individuals in 6,123 establishments. 
The sample for eastern Germany contains 196,325 employees in 3,386 establishments.  
The individual data contain information on the gross daily wage, age, gender, nationality, 
employment status, educational status23 and on the date of entry into the establishment. The 
latter is used to calculate tenure by subtracting the entry date from the ending date of the 
employer’s notification which is also included in the data. Note, however, that this tenure 
variable cannot be corrected for employment breaks as this information is not available. 
Hence this variable is only a proxy for tenure.  
The dependent variable in my empirical analysis is the real gross daily wage. The wage also 
includes such fringe benefits which are subject to social security contributions. The reported 
wage rates are top-coded at the upper contribution limit to the social security system. In my 
two samples, top-coding affects 17.66 percent of the observations from western Germany 
and 8.69 percent of those from eastern Germany. As can be seen in Tables A1 and A2 in the 
appendix, both in western and eastern Germany, male employees are more affected by top-
coding than female employees.  
Tables A1 and A2 provide descriptive statistics for the individual characteristics I use in the 
estimation. Row 1 reports the observed average log wage for male and female employees. A 
simple estimation of a wage equation for male and female employees by a Tobit model 
including a constant and a female dummy shows a substantial wage gap between sexes in 
western Germany24: The average log wage of female employees is 20.57 percent lower than 
for male employees. At only 7.79 percent the average gender wage gap is significantly lower 
in eastern Germany.25 It is also interesting to see in Table A2 that in eastern Germany there 
are little differences between the human capital of male and female employees. That means, 
there are only small differences between average job tenures and educational attainments 
between the sexes (with women actually enjoying a slight advantage). In western Germany 
the differences are more pronounced (see Table A1 in the appendix).    
I would now like to address the establishment variables described in Tables A3 and A4 in 
the appendix. The main variable used in the subsequent empirical analysis is the proportion 
of female employees in an establishment. Since I have information on all employed 
 
23 The six categories (no degree, vocational training degree, high-school degree, high-school degree and 
vocational training, university of applied science degree and university degree) are summarized to three 
categories. Missing and inconsistent data on education are corrected according to the imputation procedure 
described in Fitzenberger et al. (2006). The basic idea of this procedure is that individuals cannot lose their 
educational degrees. 
24 The estimated coefficient for the female dummy gives the mean actual wage gap. 
25 Hunt (2002) points out that the lower gender wage gap is due to a selection of better qualified women in 
employment, while the unskilled women are rather unemployed or out of labor force.  
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individuals in the establishment, I can calculate this variable directly. For comparison, I have 
also used the self-reported information from the IAB Establishment Panel. There are only 
small deviations between both measures. In the subsequent empirical analysis I have used 
the calculated proportion of female employees.26    
Row 1 in Tables A3 and A4 (in the appendix) presents the average proportion of females 
across establishments. An average man works in an establishment where women represent 
around one fourth of the workforce. Regarding this point the figures in western and eastern 
Germany are very similar. In contrast to this, women typically work in establishments where 
the proportion of females is around 50 percent of the establishment’s workforce in western 
Germany and around 60 percent of the labor force of an establishment in eastern Germany. 
Thus women tend to work in predominately female establishments, with the opposite being 
true for men.  
I use a detailed set of establishment variables to control for firm heterogeneity that may have 
been unobserved in previous studies. The set includes the size of establishments, the 
application of collective wage agreements (firm-specific and industry-wide), presence of a 
works council in the establishment, sales and wage bill per employee, state of the 
technology, the type of industry and the region where the establishment is located. I use 
additionally information on workplace attributes which might be related to gender specific 
preferences. I include a number of variables describing the extent of working hours in an 
establishment. Furthermore, I exploit information regarding an establishment’s practices for 
reconciling family and working life as well as practices for health promotion. Arrangements 
to improve the work-life balance comprise, for instance, a firm kindergarten or other child 
care facilities, mentoring programs for female members of staff, equal opportunity 
commissioners and so on. Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix show that both practices for 
reconciling family and working life as well as practices for health promotion are more 
common in establishments in western Germany than in eastern Germany. In both regions 
male employees rather work in establishments with programs promoting health than women 
do, while the opposite is true for programs to improve the work-life balance. In addition, the 
establishments provide information on which worker characteristics are important for the 
workplaces. I use information as to whether employees have to be especially flexible and 
need to be able to work under physical and mental pressure.  
 
26 I also test the other variable and detect no qualitative differences and only quantitative differences between the 
estimation results.  
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6 Empirical results  
In the empirical analysis, I investigate the impact of the proportion of females within 
establishments on wages of male and female employees. In Section 3, I introduced three 
hypotheses through which I established a relationship between gender segregation across 
establishments and individual wages. In the empirical analysis, I attempt to test these 
hypotheses. The first is based on gender differences in preferences, suggesting that the 
proportion of females captures the impact of workplace characteristics favored by women. In 
this framework the impact of sex segregation on wages is negative for both male and female 
employees according to the theory of compensating wage differentials. In the second 
hypothesis, it is assumed that women are less well-qualified, thus involving lower wage 
rates. In such cases the proportion of women reflects the low qualification needs of the 
establishment and is connected with lower wage rates. The third hypothesis is based on 
discriminatory behavior against women by the employer. The impact of the proportion of 
females is negative on male wages and positive on female wages because the proportion of 
females is inversely related to the degree of discrimination.  
The empirical strategy is as follows: I successively include individual and establishment-
specific variables describing a) the qualification and b) workplace characteristics in the wage 
regression of male and female employees. By observing the impact of the proportion of 
females on individual wages of male and female employees for each of the various 
specifications, I can test the previously discussed hypotheses concerning what lies behind the 
impact of the proportion of females within firms. That means I interpret the changes in the 
estimated coefficient of the interesting variable caused by the inclusion of information.   
For readability, Table 4.1 only presents coefficient estimates and corresponding standard 
errors for the main indicator of interest, the proportion of females within establishments. The 
complete regression results of the all specifications are in Tables A5, A6, A7 and A8 in the 
appendix.  
I start with wage regressions for male and female employees using only the proportion of 
females and a constant as explanatory variables. There appears to be a positive relationship 
between the wage rate and the variable of interest for male employees in western and eastern 
Germany. By contrast, it seems that women earn less in establishments with a high 
proportion of females. However, the estimated parameter is not significant for eastern 
German women. The explanatory power of that specification is not very large. I compare 
here, for instance, a man employed in senior positions in a typical female dominated 
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establishment such as a supermarket with an unqualified worker in a construction firm.  
Table 1: Coefficients for the establishment proportion of females in various specification of a 
log wage equation  
    Western Germany Eastern Germany 
Specification Males Females Males Females 
       
(1) proportion of females  0.1071*** -0.2316***  0.1717*** -0.0099 
  (0.0368) (0.0298) (0.0567) (0.0567)
(2) (1) + human capital + occupation  -0.2082*** -0.2669***  -0.0889* -0.0819 
       + regions (0.0241) (0.0254) (0.0458) (0.0556)
(3) (2) + establishment size + industry -0.1687*** -0.2194***  -0.1413*** -0.2452*** 
  (0.0215) (0.0277) (0.0331) (0.0399)
(4) (3) + institutional setting -0.1645*** -0.1770***  -0.1293*** -0.1993*** 
  (0.0204) (0.0263) (0.0325) (0.0338)
(5) (4) + achievement potential  -0.0870*** -0.0520**  -0.0684** -0.1202*** 
  (0.0195) (0.0232) (0.0351) (0.0330)
(6) (5) + workplace characteristics  -0.0793*** -0.0462**  -0.0728** -0.1203*** 
  (0.0188) (0.0225) (0.0345) (0.0321)
(7) (6) + interaction terms  -0.0728*** -0.0458**  -0.0703** -0.1209*** 
    (0.0179) (0.0224)  (0.0329) (0.0309)
Number of observations 565,100 192,814   120,985 75,340 
Note:  The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the establishment level. The complete 
estimation results are in Tables A5 – A8. Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: own calculation, LIAB cross-sectional model 2002.   
 
In the next specification, I control for human capital endowment and occupations. The 
estimated coefficients for the proportion of females turn out to be negative for men both in 
western and eastern Germany. For women the estimated coefficients in this specification are 
more negative than in the first specification. So far, the results show that men and women 
respectively earn less in a female dominated firm than men and women respectively with the 
same observed human capital and occupation in an establishment with a lower proportion of 
women. These results contradict the second hypothesis that establishments with a high 
proportion of females rather employ unqualified workers. If this hypothesis were true the 
estimated coefficients for the proportion of females would have to be larger in the 
specification controlling for qualification than in the specification without such controls.27  
In the third specification, I further include the establishment size (in terms of the number of 
employees) and the industry as explanatory variables in the wage regressions. The results 
show significant negative coefficients for the impact of the proportion of females on 
individual wages for both gender groups in western and eastern Germany. Furthermore, the 
estimated effect of the interesting variable is larger for female employees than for male 
                                                 
27 Note, I only control for observed qualification. A sorting based on unobserved skills is also possible and is not 
accounted for in that estimation approach. 
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employees. This pattern also appears in most international studies that control for the same 
firm-specific variables (see e.g. Bayard et al. 2003).  
In comparison to the second specification, the relationship between the proportion of females 
and individual wages is weaker in western Germany if I control for the establishment size 
and type of industry. This change is due to the selection of women in smaller firms paying at 
average lower wage rates (see results in Tables A5 and A6 in the appendix). A different 
pattern can be found in eastern Germany. The estimated coefficients for the effect of the 
proportion of females are smaller (more negative) for both gender groups in the third 
specification than in the second. Unlike in western Germany, women in eastern Germany 
tend to work in larger establishments.  
By controlling for the presence of a works council and the application of a collective 
bargaining agreement in the establishment, the estimated coefficient for the impact of the 
proportion of women becomes larger (less negative) for both gender groups in eastern as 
well as in western Germany in comparison to the last specification. This result suggests that 
female employees benefit more in terms of wages from the presence of a works council and 
the application of a wage agreement than male employees do.  
In the fifth specification, I further include variables reflecting achievement potential. I 
additionally take into account the sales and the wage bill per employee as well as a dummy 
for a state of the technology. Again the estimated coefficients for the interesting variable 
dramatically increase (become less negative) in all four sub-samples compared to the last 
specification. This is particularly pronounced for women in western Germany. The impact of 
the proportion of females is now only significant at the 5 percent level. Furthermore in 
western Germany, the effect of that variable is now larger for male than for female 
employees, a finding which differs to most other studies. The opposite pattern appears in 
eastern Germany. Here, the estimated effect of the proportion of females on individual 
wages is still larger (more negative) for women while the coefficient is only significant at the 
5 percent level for men.      
In the sixth specification, I include a large set of variables reflecting workplace attributes 
which could describe a selection of male and female employees in firms. In detail these 
variables comprise the weekly working hours, a dummy for overtime and dummy for no 
compensations for overtime working in terms of leisure or payments. Furthermore I include 
information on whether the firms explicitly implement measures to promote health and 
arrangements to improve the work-life balance. I also control as to whether the employers 
demand a high degree of flexibility and a high degree of mental and physical fitness from 
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their employees. 
For western Germany, the results show a further weakening of the relationship between the 
proportion of females within establishments and the individual wages for male and female 
employees. However, the reduction of the partial correlation is marginal compared to my 
expectations. In eastern Germany, the estimated coefficients for the proportion of females 
even decrease in comparison to the last specification. Thus the coefficients are more negative 
than they would be without controlling for the defining workplace attributes. This result is 
puzzling as it contradicts the descriptive findings which show that the proportion of women 
is higher in firms with these workplace characteristics. An explanation could be that the 
effects of these variables are captured by other characteristics for which I have controlled in 
previous specifications. For instance, the data shows that firms with works councils and 
collective bargaining also offer arrangements to improve the work-life balance and less 
weekly working hours. In order to test this, I have changed the sequence of including firm-
specific characteristics. The results are presented in Table A9 in the appendix. After 
controlling for individual characteristics, I start by taking into account the large set of 
workplace attributes. In the third specification, the estimated coefficient for the impact of the 
proportion of females becomes larger (less negative) for both gender groups in eastern as 
well as in western Germany in comparison to the last specification, controlling for individual 
characteristics. The weakening of the relationship between wages and the proportion of 
women within firms is now more pronounced than the observed change from specification 
five to six in Table 4.1. After controlling for workplace characteristics, I continue to include 
the other firm characteristics (see Table A9 in the appendix). In western Germany, the 
impact of the interesting variable changes only slightly until I take into account variables 
reflecting the achievement potential of the firm. Then the estimated coefficient for the 
proportion of females again increases dramatically (less negative) for male and female 
employees. In eastern Germany, controlling for establishment size and type of industry again 
leads to an decrease of the estimated coefficient for the interesting variable. As mentioned 
above, this is because women in eastern Germany tend to work in larger establishments.        
This robustness check confirms the first hypothesis that the proportion of females reflects the 
attractiveness of the workplace for female employees for both western and eastern Germany. 
This is often captured by other firm characteristics such as work councils or collective 
bargaining agreements.  
I also check whether the workplace characteristics have different effects for different types 
of employees by including interaction terms between individual characteristics (human 
   21
 
capital and occupation). However, as specification seven shows, the impact of the proportion 
of females within establishments on individual wages does not change compared to the 
specification without the interaction term.  
Regarding the second hypothesis my previous estimates show that the proportion of females 
within establishments does not reflect the demand for unqualified workers. I check the 
robustness of this result by running all specifications of the wage equations without 
controlling for productivity-related characteristics. I present the estimated coefficients for the 
proportion of females in Table A10 in the appendix. For male employees, I find that the 
estimated coefficient for the impact of the proportion of females is always positive in the 
wage equations without controlling for human capital and occupation. Thus the estimated 
coefficient for the interesting variable is smaller in the wage equation with controls for 
individual productivity. This result supports the conclusion that the second hypothesis does 
not hold. Otherwise, the effect would have to increase when controlling for productivity 
because these controls would absorb the negative effect of the lower productivity from the 
effect of proportion of females.  
However, for female employees such a clear pattern does not appear. For women, the 
estimated coefficient for the impact of the proportion of females within establishments is 
larger (less negative) in specifications with controls for individual productivity than in the 
specifications without these controls. This supports the hypothesis that establishments with a 
high proportion of females demand less qualified and thus primarily female workers who are 
paid less.  
The last specification shows that a negative relationship between the proportion of females 
within establishments and wages for male and female employees still exists. In eastern 
Germany the relationship is more negative for women than for men. This result is in 
accordance with most other empirical studies. In contrast, in western Germany the negative 
connection between both variables is stronger for male employees. I cannot directly test the 
third hypothesis since I cannot capture the monopsony power and discriminatory preferences 
in observable firm characteristics. However, in the last specification I control for 
productivity-related and firm-specific characteristics. Thus the remaining effect of the 
proportion of females on wages should be an indicator of employer discrimination. The 
residual effect is still negative and significant for male and female employees, but is reduced 
in magnitude. In eastern Germany the effect is larger for women than for men, while in 
western Germany the reverse holds true. So far, the estimation results do not support the 
discrimination hypothesis. In this hypothesis, the proportion of females within 
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establishments reflects the degree of prejudice against women among employers: the higher 
the aversion against women is, the lower the proportion of females. Furthermore, more 
discriminatory employers pay women less than employers who are more favorably disposed 
towards women. Thus this hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between individual 
wages and the proportion of females. The estimation results do not show this.28 Perhaps 
there is an alternative explanation as to what drives the impact of the proportion of females 
on individual wages.  
7 Conclusions 
In this study I examine why the segregation of women across establishments affects the 
wages of male and female employees. To investigate this issue, I use matched employer-
employee data from eastern and western Germany. The IAB Linked Employer-Employee 
panel (LIAB) combines data from the IAB Establishment Panel and the Employment 
Statistics Register. The data set is rich in both worker as well as establishment characteristics 
and includes particularly relevant information concerning the workforce composition of 
firms.  
My empirical results confirm the results of previous international studies (e.g. Reilly and 
Wirjanto 1999a, Bayard et al. 2003, Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica 2006) which show a 
negative relationship between the proportion of females within establishments and individual 
wages of men and women. However, it is not always clear what is actually measured by the 
impact of the proportion of females on wage rates as potentially important information is 
omitted. For this reason I attempt to go one step further. Why should there be an effect of the 
sex segregation on individual earnings? I present three hypotheses. Firstly, assuming gender 
differences in preferences for specific firm and workplace characteristics, the proportion of 
women in an establishment reflects the attractiveness of a given workplace for women for 
which they are willing to accept lower wage rates in return. Secondly, I present a 
qualification hypothesis in relation to the so-called quality sorting hypothesis. According to 
this hypothesis, the proportion of females is a proxy for the skill requirements of the firm. 
This model framework predicts that women (men) will be over-represented in firms that 
demand comparatively less (more) skilled labor, so that the gender composition effect is 
negative on both male and female wages. As a third hypothesis, I suppose that 
 
28 However, I can speculate that controlling for more workplace attributes would lead to a further decrease in the 
estimated coefficients, at least for Western Germany. Maybe the estimated coefficients turn to a positive sign. 
However, this is a speculation.  
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discriminatory behavior against women by the employer can be a reason for a connection 
between the proportion of females within firms and individual wages. I use for this a 
Becker/Arrow model of employer discrimination embedded in a monopsonisitic framework 
in order to allow for heterogeneous wages across firms. Firms are assumed to be 
heterogeneous in terms of discriminatory preferences. Since the degree of discrimination 
against females is negatively correlated with the proportion of females within establishments 
and with female wages, the model framework predicts a positive relationship between the 
proportion of females and the wage rate for women. Furthermore, the model framework 
would predict for male employees a negative relationship with the proportion of females.  
The empirical analysis does not support the last hypothesis because both men and women 
continue to be paid less in female dominated firms after controlling for productivity-related 
individual and firm characteristics. Moreover, this remaining negative impact for women is 
larger in eastern than in western Germany. As one of the omitted firm characteristic in the 
wage regression is the market structure, one explanation for this difference between eastern 
and western Germany may be that firms in eastern German can particularly exploit women 
due to their monopsonistic power.  
The second hypothesis is partly confirmed. It seems that the proportion of females partly 
reflects the low qualification of female employees, but low-qualified men are not selected in 
firms with a predominantly female workforce. As discussed before, these results only refer 
to the observed individual qualification. It is still possible that men and women with low 
unobserved labor productivity are selected by firms with a high proportion of females. In 
order to investigate this issue, a panel analysis is necessary. Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) 
investigate the quality sorting hypothesis for occupational segregation. Using a longitudinal 
analysis, they find that female dominated occupations reduce wages. They conclude that 
unobserved person-specific labor quality or preferences account for much of the negative 
relationship. However, a panel analysis is unable to ascertain whether the weakening of the 
relationship is due to preferences or labor quality. For this reason, this study chose a 
different methodological approach based on cross-section data.29 
As the strongest finding, my empirical analysis shows that the impact of the proportion of 
females within establishments on wages mainly captures a selection of male and female 
employees in different types of firms. It seems that women tend to prefer firms that offer 
 
29 I also use longitudinal data for the years 2000 to 2005. The estimations results show no significant effect of the 
proportion of females on individual wages. The comparison of longitudinal results and cross-section estimates 
suggests, that unmeasured, time-invariant worker- and establishment specific effects are correlated with 
establishment proportion of females. However, I cannot disentangle whether this effect is due to preferences, 
individual productivity or the behaviour of the employer. 
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better chances of reconciling family and work responsibilities and also accept lower wages 
in return. This outcome might reflect that a general lack of child care facilities in Germany 
creates a pressure on women to seek remedy for this lack of public infrastructure in the 
sphere of the work environment. As only some firms provide attractive workplaces, this 
constraints the number of employment opportunities for women and therefore creates a 
downward pressure on their wages. If this was true, such selection processes should be 
weaker in countries with a better public infrastructure for reconciling family and work 
responsibilities. This points to the need for an empirical cross-country comparison of the 
gender-specific workplace selection. Moreover, from a policy perspective, creating equal 
employment opportunities between men and women might be an important instrument for 
reducing the gender wage gap. For this purpose, policies should either aim at improving the 
public infrastructure and/or create incentives for men to take up an equal burden of child 
care responsibilities. 
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Appendix  
Table A 1: Summary statistics of individual characteristics for male and female employees, 
western Germany 
  Males  Females 
Variables Mean Std. dev.    Mean Std. dev.  
Log wage  4.6214 0.2683  4.4358 0.3440 
Age 40.5572 7.9364  39.4871 8.5406 
Job tenure (in months) 127.3092 96.8090  109.2366 91.0117 
Foreigner 0.1029 0.3038  0.0823 0.2748 
Without vocational training degree 0.1431 0.3502  0.1882 0.3909 
With vocational training degree 0.7048 0.4561  0.7101 0.4537 
Graduate degree 0.1520 0.3591  0.1016 0.3022 
Simple blue-collar occupation  0.2509 0.4335  0.1519 0.3589 
Qualified blue-collar occupation 0.1995 0.3996  0.0415 0.1995 
Engineers 0.1682 0.3740  0.0574 0.2325 
Service occupation  0.1282 0.3343  0.1173 0.3218 
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.1814 0.3854  0.4540 0.4979 
Profession, manager and others 0.0719 0.2583  0.1780 0.3825 
Censored wage rates 0.2091 0.4067  0.0814 0.2734 
Number of employees 565,100   192,814 
Source: own calculation, LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
 
 
Table A 2: Summary statistics of individual characteristics for male and female employees, 
eastern Germany 
  Males   Females 
Variables Mean Std. dev.    Mean Std. dev.  
Log wage  4.2680 0.3239  4.1916 0.3743 
Age 41.5545 7.9294  41.7276 7.8038 
Job tenure (in months) 77.4810 43.7862  79.6125 43.4014 
Foreigner 0.0099 0.0989  0.0065 0.0801 
Without vocational training degree 0.0368 0.1882  0.0355 0.1851 
With vocational training degree 0.7929 0.4052  0.8068 0.3948 
Graduate degree 0.1703 0.3759  0.1577 0.3644 
Simple blue-collar occupation  0.2686 0.4432  0.1455 0.3526 
Qualified blue-collar occupations 0.2501 0.4331  0.0444 0.2061 
Engineers 0.1287 0.3349  0.0708 0.2565 
Service occupation  0.1632 0.3695  0.1229 0.3283 
Clerical and administrative occupations  0.0800 0.2712  0.3361 0.4724 
Profession, manager and others 0.1094 0.3122  0.2802 0.4491 
Censored wage rate 0.1054 0.3071  0.0571 0.2320 
Number of employees 120,985   75,340 
Source: own calculation, LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 3: Summary statistics of establishment characteristics for male and female 
employees, western Germany 
  Males  Females 
Variables Mean Std. dev.    Mean Std. dev.  
Establishment proportion of females 0.2419 0.1935  0.4870 0.2411 
Employment size (1/103) 3.4952 6.5812  2.4588 5.1064 
Industry-wide wage agreement 0.7784 0.4153  0.7727 0.4191 
Firm-specific wage agreement 0.1209 0.3260  0.0969 0.2958 
No wage agreement 0.1008 0.3010  0.1304 0.3367 
Works council 0.9158 0.2777  0.8888 0.3144 
Sales per employee (1/105) 10.7694 63.6161  17.3609 79.1176 
Wage bill per employee (1/104) 0.2975 0.0945  0.2656 0.1027 
Very high or high state of the technology 0.7624 0.4256  0.7622 0.4258 
Average weekly working hours 36.9283 2.1720  37.6515 1.7136 
Overtime 0.9525 0.2128  0.9264 0.2612 
No overtime compensation  0.0023 0.0478  0.0047 0.0687 
Measures for improving work-child compatibility 0.4625 0.4986  0.4749 0.4994 
Workplace health promotion  0.8725 0.3335  0.8418 0.3649 
Workplace with physical or mental stress 0.3860 0.4868  0.3964 0.4892 
Workplace with high flexibility needs 0.6463 0.4781  0.6315 0.4824 
West Berlin  0.0464 0.2104  0.0596 0.2368 
Schleswig Holstein 0.0474 0.2126  0.0593 0.2362 
Hamburg 0.0563 0.2305  0.0599 0.2374 
Lower Saxony 0.0959 0.2944  0.0863 0.2808 
Bremen 0.0288 0.1673  0.0349 0.1835 
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.2146 0.4105  0.2023 0.4017 
Hesse 0.1301 0.3364  0.1280 0.3341 
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.0448 0.2070  0.0539 0.2258 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.1322 0.3387  0.1399 0.3469 
Bavaria 0.1428 0.3499  0.1433 0.3504 
Saarland 0.0606 0.2386  0.0327 0.1778 
Agriculture and forestry 0.0024 0.0486  0.0016 0.0400 
Electricity, gas and water supply, mining 0.0278 0.1645  0.0130 0.1132 
Manufacturing 0.6241 0.4844  0.3825 0.4860 
Construction 0.0282 0.1656  0.0076 0.0868 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.0429 0.2026  0.0710 0.2568 
Transport and communication 0.0575 0.2328  0.0274 0.1631 
Financial intermediation 0.0646 0.2459  0.1411 0.3481 
Real estate, renting and business activities 0.0601 0.2377  0.0678 0.2514 
Other service activities 0.0923 0.2895   0.2881 0.4529 
Number of establishments 5,533  5,133 
Number of employees 565,100   192,814 
Source: own calculation, LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 4: Summary statistics of establishment characteristics for male and female 
employees, eastern Germany 
  Males  Females 
Variables Mean Std. dev.    Mean Std. dev.  
Establishment proportion of females 0.2791 0.2186  0.5915 0.2504 
Employment size (1/103) 0.8036 1.3813  0.8253 1.1746 
Industry-wide wage agreement 0.5417 0.4983  0.5893 0.4920 
Firm-specific wage agreement 0.1970 0.3977  0.1607 0.3673 
No wage agreement 0.2613 0.4393  0.2499 0.4330 
Works council 0.7740 0.4183  0.7984 0.4012 
Sales per employee (1/105) 2.3112 8.7614  3.3196 13.6779 
Wage bill per employee (1/104) 0.2189 0.0887  0.2065 0.0809 
Very high or high state of the technology 0.7553 0.4299  0.7254 0.4463 
Average weekly working hours 39.2733 1.4678  39.4793 1.2643 
Overtime 0.8606 0.3463  0.7746 0.4178 
No overtime compensation  0.0056 0.0746  0.0040 0.0631 
Measures for improving work-child compatibility 0.2442 0.4296  0.3002 0.4583 
Workplace health promotion  0.8300 0.3756  0.8200 0.3842 
Workplace with physical or mental stress 0.4621 0.4986  0.5028 0.5000 
Workplace with high flexibility needs 0.6207 0.4852  0.6042 0.4890 
Berlin-East 0.0547 0.2274  0.0734 0.2608 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 0.1530 0.3600  0.1614 0.3679 
Brandenburg 0.1240 0.3296  0.1069 0.3089 
Saxony-Anhalt 0.2818 0.4499  0.2428 0.4288 
Thuringia 0.1889 0.3914  0.2184 0.4132 
Saxony 0.1976 0.3982  0.1971 0.3978 
Agriculture and forestry 0.0212 0.1440  0.0159 0.1250 
Electricity, gas and water supply, mining 0.0668 0.2497  0.0402 0.1963 
Manufacturing 0.4809 0.4996  0.2819 0.4499 
Construction 0.0923 0.2894  0.0159 0.1249 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.0374 0.1897  0.0383 0.1920 
Transport and communication 0.0770 0.2666  0.0285 0.1664 
Financial intermediation 0.0152 0.1222  0.0580 0.2338 
Real estate, renting and business activities 0.0524 0.2228  0.0616 0.2404 
Other service activities 0.1569 0.3637   0.4598 0.4984 
Number of establishments 3.035  2.746 
Number of employees 120,985   75,340 
Source: own calculation, LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 5: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for male employees, western Germany 
  Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion 0.1071*** 0.0368 -0.2082*** 0.0241 -0.1687*** 0.0215 
Age    0.0320*** 0.0020  0.0343*** 0.0017 
Age squared (1/102)   -0.0336*** 0.0021 -0.0353*** 0.0019 
Job tenure (in month)    0.0014*** 0.0001  0.0011*** 0.0001 
Job tenure squared (1/102)   -0.0003*** 0.0000 - 0.0002*** 0.0000 
Foreigner   -0.0053 0.0070 -0.0182*** 0.0047 
Without vocational training   -0.1099*** 0.0066 -0.1003*** 0.0059 
Graduate degree    0.2855*** 0.0084  0.2632*** 0.0079 
Simple blue-collar occupation     0.0318** 0.0123 -0.0135 0.0114 
Qualified blue-collar occupation    0.0742*** 0.0121  0.0423*** 0.0105 
Engineers    0.3283*** 0.0153  0.2924*** 0.0143 
Clerical and administrative occupation    0.3283*** 0.0157  0.2688*** 0.0136 
Profession, manager and others      0.3224*** 0.0153  0.3442*** 0.0128 
Employment size (1/103)      0.0219*** 0.0023 
Employment size squared (1/106)         -0.0005*** 0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement       
Firm-specific wage agreement       
Works council             
Sales per employee (1/105)       
Wage bill per employee (1/104)       
Very high or high state of the technology             
Average weekly working hours       
Overtime       
No overtime compensation        
Improving work-child compatibility       
Workplace health promotion        
Workplace with physical or mental stress       
Workplace with high flexibility needs             
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms no / no /no yes /no /no yes / yes /no 
Log pseudolikelihood -243,255.22 -55,910.22 -24,232.26 
Observations  565,100 565,100 565,100 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author. 
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 5, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for male employees, western 
Germany 
  Specification (4) Specification (5) Specification (6) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.1645*** 0.0204 -0.0870*** 0.0195 -0.0793*** 0.0188 
Age  0.0347*** 0.0017  0.0346*** 0.0016  0.0348*** 0.0016 
Age squared (1/102) -0.0359*** 0.0019 -0.0358*** 0.0018 -0.0360*** 0.0017 
Job tenure (in month)  0.0010*** 0.0001  0.0010*** 0.0001  0.0010*** 0.0001 
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0002*** 0.0000 
Foreigner -0.0168*** 0.0046 -0.0188*** 0.0043 -0.0184*** 0.0042 
Without vocational training -0.0981*** 0.0056 -0.0921*** 0.0052 -0.0935*** 0.0050 
Graduate degree  0.2572*** 0.0077  0.2380*** 0.0070  0.2367*** 0.0067 
Simple blue-collar occupation  -0.0151 0.0113 -0.0140 0.0096 -0.0170* 0.0092 
Qualified blue-collar occupation  0.0470*** 0.0104  0.0437*** 0.0092  0.0375*** 0.0087 
Engineers  0.2924*** 0.0139  0.2734*** 0.0123  0.2683*** 0.0116 
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.2691*** 0.0134  0.2520*** 0.0114  0.2501*** 0.0108 
Profession, manager and others  0.3424*** 0.0125  0.3315*** 0.0116  0.3256*** 0.0111 
Employment size (1/103)  0.0188*** 0.0022  0.0140*** 0.0024  0.0084*** 0.0021 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0004*** 0.0001 -0.0004*** 0.0001 -0.0002*** 0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0404*** 0.0107  0.0420*** 0.0095  0.0321*** 0.0092 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0470*** 0.0146  0.0553*** 0.0137  0.0396*** 0.0123 
Works council  0.1210*** 0.0109  0.0878*** 0.0104  0.0679*** 0.0103 
Sales per employee (1/105)   -0.0002** 0.0001 -0.0001* 0.0001 
Wage bill per employee (1/104)    0.7247*** 0.0546  0.6975*** 0.0518 
Very high or high state of the technology      0.0343*** 0.0074  0.0362*** 0.0064 
Average weekly working hours     -0.0114*** 0.0017 
Overtime      0.0434*** 0.0099 
No overtime compensation       0.0228 0.0228 
Improving work-child compatibility      0.0232*** 0.0071 
Workplace health promotion       0.0075 0.0075 
Workplace with physical or mental stress      0.0156** 0.0072 
Workplace with high flexibility needs         0.0053 0.0068 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes /no yes / yes /no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -16,433.64 715.51 4,492.13 
Observations  565,100 565,100 565,100 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 5, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for males employees, western 
Germany 
  Specification (7) Specification (8) Specification (9) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.0728*** 0.0179 -0.1553*** 0.0169 -0.1549*** 0.0199 
Age  0.0347*** 0.0015  0.0341*** 0.0017  0.0348*** 0.0016 
Age squared (1/102) -0.0359*** 0.0017 -0.0355*** 0.0018 -0.0359*** 0.0018 
Job tenure (in month)  0.0010*** 0.0001  0.0012*** 0.0001  0.0011*** 0.0001 
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0002*** 0.0000 
Foreigner -0.0185*** 0.0039 -0.0129*** 0.0046 -0.0171*** 0.0045 
Without vocational training  0.0317 0.0855 -0.1081*** 0.0059 -0.1014*** 0.0056 
Graduate degree  0.0264 0.1163  0.2672*** 0.0074  0.2588*** 0.0073 
Simple blue-collar occupation   0.1292 0.1769  0.0067 0.0104 -0.0191* 0.0107 
Qualified blue-collar occupation  0.2440 0.1561  0.0513*** 0.0096  0.0338*** 0.0097 
Engineers  0.9130*** 0.1799  0.3006*** 0.0125  0.2828*** 0.0132 
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.5887*** 0.1797  0.3132*** 0.0138  0.2649*** 0.0125 
Profession, manager and others  1.0588*** 0.2428  0.3082*** 0.0127  0.3350*** 0.0120 
Employment size (1/103)  0.0079*** 0.0021    0.0126*** 0.0023 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0002*** 0.0001     -0.0002*** 0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0306*** 0.0089     
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0379*** 0.0118     
Works council  0.0669*** 0.0101         
Sales per employee (1/105) -0.0001* 0.0001     
Wage bill per employee (1/104)  0.6983*** 0.0511     
Very high or high state of the technology 0.0355*** 0.0062         
Average weekly working hours -0.0058 0.0037 -0.0226*** 0.0017 -0.0165*** 0.0023 
Overtime  0.0645*** 0.0377  0.0680*** 0.0121  0.0528*** 0.0112 
No overtime compensation   0.0193 0.0233 -0.0364 0.0324 -0.0133 0.0279 
Improving work-child compatibility  0.0557*** 0.0153  0.0676*** 0.0090  0.0361*** 0.0080 
Workplace health promotion  -0.0145 0.0235  0.0394*** 0.0105  0.0252*** 0.0094 
Workplace with physical or mental stress  0.0380*** 0.0135  0.0080 0.0091  0.0124 0.0083 
Workplace with high flexibility needs  0.0023 0.0144  0.0164* 0.0086  0.0080 0.0076 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / yes yes / yes /no yes / yes /no 
Log pseudolikelihood 7,409.61 -31,464.76 -16,299.04 
Observations  565,100 565,100 565,100 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 5, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for males employees, western 
Germany 
  Specification (10) Specification (11) Specification (12) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.1555*** 0.0195  0.0717** 0.0301  0.0671** 0.0302 
Age  0.0350*** 0.0016     
Age squared (1/102) -0.0362*** 0.0018     
Job tenure (in month)  0.0010*** 0.0001     
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0002*** 0.0000     
Foreigner -0.0165*** 0.0044     
Without vocational training -0.0993*** 0.0053     
Graduate degree  0.2549*** 0.0073     
Simple blue-collar occupation  -0.0190** 0.0106     
Qualified blue-collar occupation  0.0394*** 0.0097     
Engineers  0.2850*** 0.0129     
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.2658*** 0.0125     
Profession, manager and others  0.3351*** 0.0118         
Employment size (1/103)  0.0123*** 0.0022  0.0265*** 0.0029  0.0236*** 0.0026 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0005*** 0.0001 -0.0005*** 0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0287*** 0.0102    0.0167 0.0194 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0286** 0.0131   -0.0106 0.0238 
Works council  0.0973*** 0.0110      0.1857*** 0.0160 
Sales per employee (1/105)       
Wage bill per employee (1/104)       
Very high or high state of the technology             
Average weekly working hours -0.0126*** 0.0021     
Overtime  0.0437*** 0.0110     
No overtime compensation   0.0136 0.0267     
Improving work-child compatibility  0.0294*** 0.0079     
Workplace health promotion   0.0083 0.0088     
Workplace with physical or mental stress  0.0145* 0.0080     
Workplace with high flexibility needs  0.0088 0.0075         
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes /no yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -11,981.09 -206,517.71 -198,969.22 
Observations  565,100 565,100 565,100 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 5, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for males employees, western 
Germany 
  Specification (13) Specification (14) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Female proportion  0.1829*** 0.0241  0.1767***0.0236 
Age     
Age squared (1/102)     
Job tenure (in month)     
Job tenure squared (1/102)     
Foreigner     
Without vocational training     
Graduate degree     
Simple blue-collar occupation      
Qualified blue-collar occupation     
Engineers     
Clerical and administrative occupation     
Profession, manager and others         
Employment size (1/103)  0.0147*** 0.0030  0.0088***0.0029 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0004***0.0001  0.0002***0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0235* 0.0142  0.0094 0.0140 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0103 0.0176 -0.0119 0.0172 
Works council  0.1227*** 0.0139  0.1013***0.0136 
Sales per employee (1/105) -0.0003* 0.0002  0.0002* 0.0001 
Wage bill per employee (1/104)  1.2600*** 0.0819  1.2143***0.0766 
Very high or high state of the technology  0.0465*** 0.0083  0.0476***0.0079 
Average weekly working hours    0.0128***0.0027 
Overtime    0.0590***0.0136 
No overtime compensation     0.0727** 0.0319 
Improving work-child compatibility    0.0346***0.0088 
Workplace health promotion     0.0019 0.0091 
Workplace with physical or mental stress   -0.0051 0.0086 
Workplace with high flexibility needs      0.0310***0.0080 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -169,955.29 -166,251.24 
Observations  565,100 565,100 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 6: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, western Germany 
  Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.2316*** 0.0298 -0.2669*** 0.0254 -0.2194*** 0.0277 
Age    0.0260*** 0.0017  0.0285*** 0.0016 
Age squared (1/102)   -0.0302*** 0.0020 -0.0317*** 0.0019 
Job tenure (in month)    0.0012*** 0.0001  0.0010*** 0.0001 
Job tenure squared (1/102)   -0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0001*** 0.0000 
Foreigner   -0.0165*** 0.0059 -0.0141** 0.0055 
Without vocational training   -0.1051*** 0.0065 -0.1037*** 0.0057 
Graduate degree    0.3465*** 0.0089  0.3186*** 0.0086 
Simple blue-collar occupation    -0.0503*** 0.0151 -0.1030*** 0.0145 
Qualified blue-collar occupation   -0.0519*** 0.0139 -0.0880*** 0.0123 
Engineers    0.1914*** 0.0232  0.1472*** 0.0179 
Clerical and administrative occupation    0.1882*** 0.0161  0.1266*** 0.0114 
Profession, manager and others      0.2459*** 0.0109  0.2472*** 0.0104 
Employment size (1/103)      0.0333*** 0.0036 
Employment size squared (1/106)         -0.0008*** 0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement       
Firm-specific wage agreement       
Works council             
Sales per employee (1/105)       
Wage bill per employee (1/104)       
Very high or high state of the technology             
Average weekly working hours       
Overtime       
No overtime compensation        
Improving work-child compatibility       
Workplace health promotion        
Workplace with physical or mental stress       
Workplace with high flexibility needs             
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms  no / no / no yes /no / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -843,89.52 -46,300.90 -34,812.51 
Observations  192,814 192,814 192,814 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 6, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, western 
Germany 
  Specification (4) Specification (5) Specification (6) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.1770*** 0.0263 -0.0520** 0.0232 -0.0462** 0.0225 
Age  0.0293*** 0.0016  0.0283*** 0.0015  0.0284*** 0.0015 
Age squared (1/102) -0.0326*** 0.0018 -0.0314*** 0.0017 -0.0314*** 0.0017 
Job tenure (in month)  0.0008*** 0.0001  0.0009*** 0.0001  0.0009*** 0.0001 
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0001*** 0.0000 
Foreigner -0.0147*** 0.0052 -0.0182*** 0.0048 -0.0174*** 0.0045 
Without vocational training -0.1017*** 0.0056 -0.0975*** 0.0051 -0.0976*** 0.0049 
Graduate degree  0.3098*** 0.0083  0.2917*** 0.0073  0.2917*** 0.0072 
Simple blue-collar occupation  -0.1053*** 0.0141 -0.0910*** 0.0124 -0.0953*** 0.0115 
Qualified blue-collar occupation -0.0825*** 0.0120 -0.0884*** 0.0105 -0.0892*** 0.0100 
Engineers  0.1459*** 0.0169  0.1280*** 0.0151  0.1294*** 0.0141 
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.1295*** 0.0113  0.1151*** 0.0099  0.1160*** 0.0094 
Profession, manager and others  0.2374*** 0.0102  0.2283*** 0.0088  0.2276*** 0.0085 
Employment size (1/103)  0.0270*** 0.0032  0.0224*** 0.0027  0.0172*** 0.0026 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0006*** 0.0001 -0.0006*** 0.0001 -0.0004*** 0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0544*** 0.0120  0.0586*** 0.0113  0.0481*** 0.0107 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0427** 0.0177  0.0475*** 0.0165  0.0300** 0.0145 
Works council  0.1978*** 0.0168  0.1603*** 0.0164  0.1319*** 0.0145 
Sales per employee (1/105)   -0.0002** 0.0001 -0.0002* 0.0001 
Wage bill per employee (1/104)    0.8957*** 0.0865  0.8553*** 0.0824 
Very high or high state of the technology      0.0172*** 0.0080  0.0168** 0.0079 
Average weekly working hours     -0.0172*** 0.0026 
Overtime      0.0439*** 0.0110 
No overtime compensation       0.0233 0.0302 
Improving work-child compatibility      0.0167** 0.0072 
Workplace health promotion       0.0335*** 0.0085 
Workplace with physical or mental stress     -0.0051 0.0071 
Workplace with high flexibility needs          0.0198*** 0.0066 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms  yes / yes /no yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -29,500.68 -23,211.94 -21,815.03 
Observations  192,814 192,814 192,814 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 6, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, western 
Germany 
  Specification (7) Specification (8) Specification (9) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.0458** 0.0224 -0.1810*** 0.0215 -0.1896*** 0.0257 
Age  0.0282*** 0.0014  0.0269*** 0.0016  0.0288*** 0.0016 
Age squared (1/102) -0.0312*** 0.0017 -0.0306*** 0.0019 -0.0318*** 0.0019 
Job tenure (in month)  0.0009*** 0.0001  0.0010*** 0.0001  0.0009*** 0.0001 
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0001*** 0.0000 
Foreigner -0.0175*** 0.0043 -0.0148** 0.0053 -0.0128** 0.0051 
Without vocational training  0.3361** 0.1206 -0.1052*** 0.0057 -0.1035*** 0.0054 
Graduate degree -0.3013* 0.1561  0.3297*** 0.0085  0.3142*** 0.0083 
Simple blue-collar occupation   0.3829 0.2880 -0.0876*** 0.0130 -0.1102*** 0.0132 
Qualified blue-collar occupation  0.4586* 0.2734 -0.0687*** 0.0119 -0.0880*** 0.0111 
Engineers  1.2414*** 0.3134  0.1659*** 0.0177  0.1455*** 0.0162 
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.8425*** 0.2878  0.1722*** 0.0129  0.1272*** 0.0107 
Profession, manager and others  1.7600*** 0.3364  0.2413*** 0.0100  0.2438*** 0.0099 
Employment size (1/103)  0.0179*** 0.0024    0.0225*** 0.0034 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0005*** 0.0001     -0.0005*** 0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0478*** 0.0107     
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0311** 0.0142     
Works council  0.1288*** 0.0147         
Sales per employee (1/105) -0.0002* 0.0001     
Wage bill per employee (1/104)  0.8542*** 0.0816     
Very high or high state of the technology  0.0164** 0.0074         
Average weekly working hours  0.0000 0.0076 -0.0249*** 0.0031 -0.0261*** 0.0037 
Overtime  0.0709*** 0.0209  0.0861*** 0.0131  0.0624*** 0.0118 
No overtime compensation   0.0219 0.0307 -0.0389 0.0417 -0.0296 0.0312 
Improving work-child compatibility  0.0528*** 0.0143  0.0853*** 0.0110  0.0374*** 0.0084 
Workplace health promotion   0.0308 0.0190  0.0993*** 0.0122  0.0696*** 0.0106 
Workplace with physical or mental stress  0.0342** 0.0155 -0.0273** 0.0101 -0.0182** 0.0083 
Workplace with high flexibility needs  0.0171 0.0149  0.0354*** 0.0114  0.0272*** 0.0081 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms  yes / yes / yes yes / yes /no yes / yes /no 
Log pseudolikelihood -21,054.55 -37,818.12 -30,847.80 
Observations  192,814 192,814 192,814 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 6, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, western 
Germany 
  Specification (10) Specification (11) Specification (12) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.1669*** 0.0252 -0.3069*** 0.0333 -0.2656*** 0.0314 
Age  0.0294*** 0.0016     
Age squared (1/102) -0.0325*** 0.0018     
Job tenure (in month)  0.0008*** 0.0001     
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0001*** 0.0000     
Foreigner -0.0139*** 0.0049     
Without vocational training -0.1017*** 0.0054     
Graduate degree  0.3085*** 0.0081     
Simple blue-collar occupation  -0.1100*** 0.0129     
Qualified blue-collar occupation -0.0842*** 0.0110     
Engineers  0.1444*** 0.0156     
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.1289*** 0.0105     
Profession, manager and others  0.2359*** 0.0096         
Employment size (1/103)  0.0210*** 0.0031  0.0389*** 0.0045  0.0317*** 0.0042 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0004*** 0.0001 -0.0008*** 0.0001 -0.0006*** 0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0415*** 0.0112    0.0626*** 0.0150 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0208 0.0154    0.0284 0.0234 
Works council  0.1619*** 0.0147      0.2270*** 0.0204 
Sales per employee (1/105)        
Wage bill per employee (1/104)       
Very high or high state of the technology             
Average weekly working hours -0.0192*** 0.0032     
Overtime  0.0419*** 0.0113     
No overtime compensation  -0.0104 0.0285     
Improving work-child compatibility  0.0250*** 0.0082     
Workplace health promotion   0.0408*** 0.0097     
Workplace with physical or mental stress -0.0095 0.0078     
Workplace with high flexibility needs  0.0271*** 0.0079         
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms  yes / yes /no yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -27,656.16 -67,723.87 -62,615.47 
Observations  192,814 192,814 192,814 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 6, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, western 
Germany 
  Specification (13) Specification (14) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Female proportion -0.0825***0.0290 -0.0816***0.0286 
Age     
Age squared (1/102)     
Job tenure (in month)     
Job tenure squared (1/102)     
Foreigner     
Without vocational training     
Graduate degree     
Simple blue-collar occupation      
Qualified blue-collar occupation     
Engineers     
Clerical and administrative occupation     
Profession, manager and others         
Employment size (1/103)  0.0255*** 0.0035  0.0204*** 0.0034 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0006***0.0001 -0.0005***0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0678*** 0.0138  0.0578*** 0.0137 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0348* 0.0194  0.0195 0.0182 
Works council  0.1771*** 0.0197  0.1531*** 0.0185 
Sales per employee (1/105) -0.0004** 0.0002 -0.0003** 0.0001 
Wage bill per employee (1/104)  1.1962*** 0.1131  1.1590*** 0.1099 
Very high or high state of the technology  0.0197** 0.0096  0.0183* 0.0100 
Average weekly working hours   -0.0120***0.0040 
Overtime    0.0496*** 0.0143 
No overtime compensation     0.0518 0.0347 
Improving work-child compatibility    0.0264*** 0.0096 
Workplace health promotion     0.0222** 0.0101 
Workplace with physical or mental stress   -0.0037 0.0096 
Workplace with high flexibility needs      0.0283*** 0.0082 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -54,275.75 -53,369.50 
Observations  192,814 192,814 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 7, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for male employees, eastern 
Germany 
  Specification (7) Specification (8) Specification (9) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.0703** 0.0329 -0.0675* 0.0414 -0.1354*** 0.0324 
Age  0.0293*** 0.0022  0.0294*** 0.0023  0.0311*** 0.0024 
Age squared (1/102) -0.0342*** 0.0026 -0.0356*** 0.0025 -0.0368*** 0.0027 
Job tenure (in month)  0.0030*** 0.0003  0.0048*** 0.0008  0.0035*** 0.0003 
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0011*** 0.0002 -0.0020*** 0.0006 -0.0012*** 0.0002 
Foreigner  0.0093 0.0118  0.0176 0.0148  0.0296** 0.0136 
Without vocational training -0.3468 0.2717 -0.0780*** 0.0126 -0.0569*** 0.0117 
Graduate degree -0.2246 0.2698  0.3792*** 0.0134  0.3399*** 0.0133 
Simple blue-collar occupation   1.0842*** 0.2869  0.0170 0.0196 -0.0135 0.0143 
Qualified blue-collar occupation  0.9474*** 0.2365  0.0168 0.0123  0.0129 0.0120 
Engineers  1.4793*** 0.4113  0.2262*** 0.0167  0.2250*** 0.0180 
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.8075*** 0.2870  0.2352*** 0.0220  0.2122*** 0.0178 
Profession, manager and others  0.9394** 0.3883  0.2040*** 0.0203  0.2510*** 0.0208 
Employment size (1/103)  0.0547*** 0.0175    0.1134*** 0.0187 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0035 0.0023     -0.0082*** 0.0027 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0708*** 0.0126     
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0077 0.0157     
Works council  0.0964*** 0.0147         
Sales per employee (1/105)  0.0038* 0.0021     
Wage bill per employee (1/104)  0.7730** 0.3379     
Very high or high state of the technology  0.0343*** 0.0099         
Average weekly working hours -0.0071** 0.0034 -0.0372*** 0.0066 -0.0326*** 0.0053 
Overtime  0.1120*** 0.0324  0.1088*** 0.0238  0.0754*** 0.0180 
No overtime compensation   0.1073** 0.0509  0.0250 0.0785  0.1107 0.0849 
Improving work-child compatibility  0.0381* 0.0201  0.0686*** 0.0201  0.0284** 0.0159 
Workplace health promotion  -0.0272 0.0214  0.1038*** 0.0209  0.0572*** 0.0131 
Workplace with physical or mental stress -0.0235 0.0179 -0.0379** 0.0199 -0.0152 0.0120 
Workplace with high flexibility needs  0.0001 0.0157 -0.0175 0.0281  0.0062 0.0111 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / no yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood 6,757.33 -15,668.79 -4,276.65 
Observations  120,985 120,985 120,985 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 7: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for male employees, eastern Germany 
  Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion 0.1717*** 0.0567 -0.0889* 0.0458 -0.1413*** 0.0331 
Age    0.0307*** 0.0025  0.0324*** 0.0025 
Age squared (1/102)   -0.0376*** 0.0027 -0.0385*** 0.0029 
Job tenure (in month)    0.0048*** 0.0009  0.0035*** 0.0004 
Job tenure squared (1/102)   -0.0018*** 0.0007 -0.0011*** 0.0002 
Foreigner    0.0269 0.0170  0.0321** 0.0147 
Without vocational training   -0.0748*** 0.0126 -0.0521*** 0.0112 
Graduate degree    0.4060*** 0.0148  0.3480*** 0.0140 
Simple blue-collar occupation     0.0352 0.0227 -0.0066 0.0148 
Qualified blue-collar occupation    0.0308** 0.0139  0.0229* 0.0127 
Engineers    0.2406*** 0.0176  0.2331*** 0.0184 
Clerical and administrative occupation    0.2459*** 0.0214  0.2193*** 0.0168 
Profession, manager and others      0.1884*** 0.0212  0.2575*** 0.0218 
Employment size (1/103)      0.1587*** 0.0211 
Employment size squared (1/106)         -0.0150*** 0.0030 
Industry-wide wage agreement       
Firm-specific wage agreement       
Works council             
Sales per employee (1/105)       
Wage bill per employee (1/104)       
Very high or high state of the technology             
Average weekly working hours       
Overtime       
No overtime compensation        
Improving work-child compatibility       
Workplace health promotion        
Workplace with physical or mental stress       
Workplace with high flexibility needs             
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms no / no / no yes / no /no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -54,723.55 -22,515.08 -7,955.87 
Observations  120,985 120,985 120,985 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 7, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for male employees, eastern 
Germany 
  Specification (4) Specification (5) Specification (6) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.1293*** 0.0325 -0.0684* 0.0351 -0.0728** 0.0345 
Age  0.0311*** 0.0023  0.0303*** 0.0023  0.0301*** 0.0022 
Age squared (1/102) -0.0369*** 0.0027 -0.0355*** 0.0027 -0.0351*** 0.0026 
Job tenure (in month)  0.0033*** 0.0003  0.0030*** 0.0003  0.0031*** 0.0003 
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0013*** 0.0002 -0.0011*** 0.0002 -0.0012*** 0.0002 
Foreigner  0.0121 0.0131  0.0057 0.0129  0.0078 0.0126 
Without vocational training -0.0485*** 0.0100 -0.0456*** 0.0092 -0.0482*** 0.0093 
Graduate degree  0.3233*** 0.0129  0.2968*** 0.0147  0.2969*** 0.0140 
Simple blue-collar occupation  -0.0010 0.0137 -0.0076 0.0115 -0.0098 0.0115 
Qualified blue-collar occupation  0.0369*** 0.0117  0.0275*** 0.0099  0.0222** 0.0097 
Engineers  0.2445*** 0.0178  0.2348*** 0.0158  0.2311*** 0.0159 
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.2356*** 0.0167  0.2242*** 0.0158  0.2204*** 0.0167 
Profession, manager and others  0.2697*** 0.0197  0.2618*** 0.0181  0.2581*** 0.0179 
Employment size (1/103)  0.0857*** 0.0202  0.0639*** 0.0195  0.0582*** 0.0187 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0067** 0.0028 -0.0057** 0.0025 -0.0044* 0.0024 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.1047*** 0.0152  0.0824*** 0.0143  0.0743*** 0.0132 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0263 0.0204  0.0185 0.0174  0.0080 0.0167 
Works council  0.1525*** 0.0153  0.1142*** 0.0164  0.1010*** 0.0152 
Sales per employee (1/105)    0.0039* 0.0022  0.0038* 0.0021 
Wage bill per employee (1/104)    0.8292** 0.3557  0.7830** 0.3429 
Very high or high state of the technology      0.0307*** 0.0107  0.0312*** 0.0105 
Average weekly working hours     -0.0174*** 0.0040 
Overtime      0.0499*** 0.0150 
No overtime compensation       0.1085** 0.0550 
Improving work-child compatibility     -0.0024 0.0130 
Workplace health promotion       0.0111 0.0109 
Workplace with physical or mental stress     -0.0139 0.0106 
Workplace with high flexibility needs          0.0100 0.0091 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / no yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -1,089.98 4,533.63 5,752.97 
Observations  120,985 120,985 120,985 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 7, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for male employees, eastern 
Germany 
  Specification (10) Specification (11) Specification (12) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.1296*** 0.0318 -0.0054 0.0424  0.0109 0.0418 
Age  0.0307*** 0.0023     
Age squared (1/102) -0.0362*** 0.0027     
Job tenure (in month)  0.0034*** 0.0003     
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0013*** 0.0002     
Foreigner  0.0127 0.0125     
Without vocational training -0.0515*** 0.0104     
Graduate degree  0.3197*** 0.0123     
Simple blue-collar occupation  -0.0047 0.0134     
Qualified blue-collar occupation  0.0289** 0.0113     
Engineers  0.2390*** 0.0176     
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.2296*** 0.0179     
Profession, manager and others  0.2649*** 0.0192         
Employment size (1/103)  0.0707*** 0.0194  0.2432*** 0.0254  0.1445*** 0.0249 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0041 0.0028 -0.0283*** 0.0037 -0.0165*** 0.0035 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0925*** 0.0138    0.1172*** 0.0186 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0133 0.0193    0.0340 0.0261 
Works council  0.1332*** 0.0141      0.2025*** 0.0183 
Sales per employee (1/105)       
Wage bill per employee (1/104)       
Very high or high state of the technology             
Average weekly working hours -0.0198*** 0.0044     
Overtime  0.0667*** 0.0165     
No overtime compensation   0.1422*** 0.0694     
Improving work-child compatibility  0.0148 0.0150     
Workplace health promotion   0.0190 0.0117     
Workplace with physical or mental stress -0.0209** 0.0112     
Workplace with high flexibility needs  0.0130 0.0103         
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / no yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood 695.00 -42,504.92 -36,065.71 
Observations  120,985 120,985 120,985 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 7, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for male employees, eastern 
Germany 
  Specification (13) Specification (14) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Female proportion  0.0889** 0.0434  0.0804* 0.0427 
Age     
Age squared (1/102)     
Job tenure (in month)     
Job tenure squared (1/102)     
Foreigner     
Without vocational training     
Graduate degree     
Simple blue-collar occupation      
Qualified blue-collar occupation     
Engineers     
Clerical and administrative occupation     
Profession, manager and others         
Employment size (1/103)  0.1106*** 0.0233  0.1004*** 0.0227 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0144***0.0029 -0.0125***0.0029 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0834*** 0.0183  0.0749*** 0.0169 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0214 0.0219  0.0100 0.0207 
Works council  0.1454*** 0.0213  0.1372*** 0.0196 
Sales per employee (1/105)  0.0043* 0.0023  0.0040* 0.0021 
Wage bill per employee (1/104)  1.1717** 0.4995  1.1071** 0.4841 
Very high or high state of the technology  0.0341*** 0.0130  0.0344*** 0.0128 
Average weekly working hours   -0.0147***0.0044 
Overtime    0.0551*** 0.0182 
No overtime compensation     0.1641** 0.0771 
Improving work-child compatibility    0.0107 0.0167 
Workplace health promotion     0.0070 0.0127 
Workplace with physical or mental stress   -0.0323** 0.0136 
Workplace with high flexibility needs      0.0191* 0.0106 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -29,625.48 -28,717.36 
Observations  120,985 120,985 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 8: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, eastern Germany 
  Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3) 
Variables Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.0099 0.0567 -0.0819 0.0556 -0.2452*** 0.0399 
Age    0.0383*** 0.0039  0.0412*** 0.0032 
Age squared (1/102)   -0.0453*** 0.0038 -0.0483*** 0.0036 
Job tenure (in month)    0.0051*** 0.0009  0.0040*** 0.0005 
Job tenure squared (1/102)   -0.0018** 0.0007 -0.0012*** 0.0004 
Foreigner    0.0623 0.0425  0.0546 0.0374 
Without vocational training   -0.0621*** 0.0210 -0.0504*** 0.0185 
Graduate degree    0.3296*** 0.0145  0.2941*** 0.0125 
Simple blue-collar occupation    -0.0757** 0.0323 -0.0384 0.0249 
Qualified blue-collar occupation   -0.0544* 0.0290 -0.0348 0.0223 
Engineers    0.1827*** 0.0289  0.1670*** 0.0247 
Clerical and administrative occupation     0.1964*** 0.0386  0.1575*** 0.0238 
Profession, manager and others      0.2735*** 0.0238  0.2727*** 0.0240 
Employment size (1/103)      0.1702*** 0.0307 
Employment size squared (1/106)         -0.0187** 0.0075 
Industry-wide wage agreement       
Firm-specific wage agreement       
Works council             
Sales per employee (1/105)       
Wage bill per employee (1/104)       
Very high or high state of the technology             
Average weekly working hours       
Overtime       
No overtime compensation        
Improving work-child compatibility       
Workplace health promotion        
Workplace with physical or mental stress       
Workplace with high flexibility needs             
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms no / no / no yes / no / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -37,926.55 -20,080.85 -11,633.91 
Observations  75,340 75,340 75,340 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 8, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, eastern 
Germany 
  Specification (4) Specification (5) Specification (6) 
Variables Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.1993*** 0.0338 -0.1202*** 0.0330 -0.1203*** 0.0321 
Age  0.0388*** 0.0029  0.0384*** 0.0026  0.0384*** 0.0026 
Age squared (1/102) -0.0448*** 0.0032 -0.0438*** 0.0029 -0.0438*** 0.0029 
Job tenure (in month)  0.0036*** 0.0004  0.0033*** 0.0004  0.0033*** 0.0004 
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0013*** 0.0003 -0.0013*** 0.0002 -0.0013*** 0.0003 
Foreigner  0.0287 0.0273  0.0232 0.0280  0.0231 0.0247 
Without vocational training -0.0414** 0.0169 -0.0327** 0.0160 -0.0392*** 0.0149 
Graduate degree  0.2823*** 0.0110  0.2672*** 0.0111  0.2679*** 0.0106 
Simple blue-collar occupation  -0.0386* 0.0212 -0.0366* 0.0187 -0.0277 0.0183 
Qualified blue-collar occupation -0.0379** 0.0191 -0.0430** 0.0170 -0.0372** 0.0170 
Engineers  0.1747*** 0.0231  0.1674*** 0.0207  0.1782*** 0.0209 
Clerical and administrative occupation   0.1623*** 0.0202  0.1460*** 0.0179  0.1519*** 0.0183 
Profession, manager and others  0.2509*** 0.0200  0.2386*** 0.0190  0.2402*** 0.0191 
Employment size (1/103)  0.0805*** 0.0246  0.0589*** 0.0209  0.0580*** 0.0214 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0069 0.0053 -0.0054 0.0042 -0.0049 0.0042 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.1228*** 0.0241  0.1003*** 0.0232  0.0976*** 0.0220 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0144 0.0282  0.0161 0.0239  0.0130 0.0227 
Works council  0.2395*** 0.0238  0.1870*** 0.0253  0.1701*** 0.0245 
Sales per employee (1/105)    0.0004 0.0008  0.0004 0.0008 
Wage bill per employee (1/104)    1.0434*** 0.3409  1.0356*** 0.3489 
Very high or high state of the technology      0.0146 0.0127  0.0119 0.0127 
Average weekly working hours     -0.0208*** 0.0054 
Overtime      0.0300** 0.0138 
No overtime compensation       0.0467 0.0668 
Improving work-child compatibility     -0.0098 0.0138 
Workplace health promotion       0.0218 0.0141 
Workplace with physical or mental stress      0.0114 0.0133 
Workplace with high flexibility needs          0.0009 0.0126 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / no yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -5,249.51 -2,154.62 -1,626.10 
Observations  75,340 75,340 75,340 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 8, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, eastern 
Germany 
  Specification (7) Specification (8) Specification (9) 
Variables Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.1209*** 0.0309 -0.0442 0.0462 -0.2231*** 0.0387 
Age  0.0372*** 0.0023  0.0394*** 0.0034  0.0416*** 0.0033 
Age squared (1/102) -0.0423*** 0.0027 -0.0462*** 0.0036 -0.0484*** 0.0037 
Job tenure (in month)  0.0032*** 0.0003  0.0047*** 0.0008  0.0038*** 0.0006 
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0012*** 0.0002 -0.0017*** 0.0006 -0.0012*** 0.0004 
Foreigner  0.0104 0.0198  0.0522 0.0356  0.0505* 0.0306 
Without vocational training  0.8617* 0.5230 -0.0637*** 0.0185 -0.0587*** 0.0168 
Graduate degree -0.2419 0.2020  0.3162*** 0.0130  0.2901*** 0.0122 
Simple blue-collar occupation  10,861 0.7980 -0.0659*** 0.0307 -0.0272 0.0238 
Qualified blue-collar occupation  2.2363*** 0.4579 -0.0429* 0.0260 -0.0258 0.0220 
Engineers  2.5088*** 0.5216  0.1935*** 0.0263  0.1862*** 0.0250 
Clerical and administrative occupation   1.7888*** 0.4112  0.2001*** 0.0323  0.1685*** 0.0241 
Profession, manager and others  1.7561*** 0.4345  0.2760*** 0.0223  0.2742*** 0.0236 
Employment size (1/103)  0.0565*** 0.0211    0.1426*** 0.0299 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0050 0.0044     -0.0143 0.0074 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0995*** 0.0206     
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0154 0.0213     
Works council  0.1630*** 0.0234         
Sales per employee (1/105)  0.0005 0.0008     
Wage bill per employee (1/104)  0.9937*** 0.3406     
Very high or high state of the technology  0.0177 0.0118         
Average weekly working hours  0.0061 0.0083 -0.0294*** 0.0068 -0.0358*** 0.0063 
Overtime  0.0899** 0.0414  0.0542* 0.0306  0.0600*** 0.0222 
No overtime compensation   0.0414 0.0689 -0.0832 0.0688 -0.0376 0.0802 
Improving work-child compatibility  0.0755*** 0.0257  0.1145*** 0.0245  0.0182 0.0193 
Workplace health promotion   0.0353 0.0408  0.1222*** 0.0273  0.0749*** 0.0212 
Workplace with physical or mental stress  0.0438 0.0274  0.0235 0.0212  0.0051 0.0167 
Workplace with high flexibility needs  0.0237 0.0295 -0.0062 0.0218 -0.0047 0.0176 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / yes yes / yes /no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -705.27 -16,884.69 -9,985.71 
Observations  75,340 75,340 75,340 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 8, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, eastern 
Germany 
  Specification (10) Specification (11) Specification (12) 
Variables Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.1906*** 0.0000 -0.3493*** 0.0467 -0.3000*** 0.0395 
Age  0.0392*** 0.0000     
Age squared (1/102) -0.0450*** 0.0000     
Job tenure (in month)  0.0036*** 0.0000     
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0014*** 0.0000     
Foreigner  0.0271 0.2590     
Without vocational training -0.0477*** 0.0030     
Graduate degree  0.2803*** 0.0000     
Simple blue-collar occupation  -0.0309 0.1300     
Qualified blue-collar occupation -0.0323 0.0890     
Engineers  0.1865*** 0.0000     
Clerical and administrative occupation   0.1691*** 0.0000     
Profession, manager and others  0.2538*** 0.0000         
Employment size (1/103)  0.0736*** 0.0030  0.2326*** 0.0339  0.1130*** 0.0261 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0056 0.2990 -0.0306*** 0.0082 -0.0138*** 0.0052 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.1209*** 0.0000    0.1410*** 0.0304 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0119 0.6570    0.0115 0.0359 
Works council  0.2167*** 0.0000      0.3003*** 0.0289 
Sales per employee (1/105)       
Wage bill per employee (1/104)       
Very high or high state of the technology             
Average weekly working hours -0.0219*** 0.0000     
Overtime  0.0425*** 0.0130     
No overtime compensation   0.0518 0.4610     
Improving work-child compatibility  0.0102 0.5280     
Workplace health promotion   0.0310* 0.0560     
Workplace with physical or mental stress -0.0019 0.8940     
Workplace with high flexibility needs -0.0008 0.9560         
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / no yes / yes / no yes / yes /no 
Log pseudolikelihood -4,616.97 -27,218.58 -20,404.96 
Observations  75,340 75,340 75,340 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 8, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, eastern 
Germany 
  Specification (13) Specification (14) 
Variables Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Female proportion -0.1874***0.0388 -0.1901***0.0373 
Age     
Age squared (1/102)     
Job tenure (in month)     
Job tenure squared (1/102)     
Foreigner     
Without vocational training     
Graduate degree     
Simple blue-collar occupation      
Qualified blue-collar occupation     
Engineers     
Clerical and administrative occupation      
Profession, manager and others         
Employment size (1/103)  0.0814*** 0.0224  0.0810*** 0.0227 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0111***0.0039 -0.0105***0.0039 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.1090*** 0.0282  0.1054*** 0.0269 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0142 0.0285  0.0097 0.0269 
Works council  0.2229*** 0.0310  0.2063*** 0.0298 
Sales per employee (1/105)  0.0007 0.0008  0.0008 0.0008 
Wage bill per employee (1/104)  1.3758*** 0.4359  1.3656*** 0.4459 
Very high or high state of the technology  0.0274* 0.0143  0.0230* 0.0140 
Average weekly working hours   -0.0192***0.0065 
Overtime    0.0381 0.0151 
No overtime compensation     0.0199 0.0935 
Improving work-child compatibility   -0.0079 0.0160 
Workplace health promotion     0.0127 0.0162 
Workplace with physical or mental stress    0.0117 0.0158 
Workplace with high flexibility needs      0.0141 0.0144 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -16,563.54 -16,164.01 
Observations  75,340 75,340 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry controls 
and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table A 9: Coefficients for the proportion of females in establishments in various 
specifications of a log wage equation 
    Western Germany  Eastern Germany 
 Specification Males Females  Males Females 
       
(1) proportion of females  0.1071*** -0.2316***  0.1717*** -0.0099 
  (0.0368) (0.0298) (0.0567) (0.0567)
(2) (1) + human capital + occupation  -0.2082*** -0.2669***  -0.0889* -0.0819 
      + regions (0.0241) (0.0254) (0.0458) (0.0556)
(8) (2) + workplace characteristics -0.1553*** -0.1810***  -0.0675* -0.0442 
  (0.0169) (0.0215) (0.0414) (0.0462)
(9) (8) + establishment size + industry -0.1549*** -0.1896***  -0.1354*** -0.2231*** 
  (0.0199) (0.0257) (0.0324) (0.0387)
(10) (9) + institutional setting -0.1555*** -0.1669***  -0.1296*** -0.1906*** 
  (0.0195) (0.0252) (0.0318) (0.0334)
(5) (10) + achievement potential -0.0793*** -0.0462**  -0.0728** -0.1203*** 
    (0.0188) (0.0225)  (0.0345) (0.0321)
Number of observations 565,100 192,814   120,985 75,340 
Note:  The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the establishment level. The complete 
estimation results are in Tables C5 – C8. Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: own calculation, LIAB cross-sectional model 2002.   
 
 
 
Table A 10: Coefficients for the proportion of females in establishments in various 
specifications of a log wage equation without controlling for individual productivity-related 
characteristics 
    Western Germany Eastern Germany 
 Specification Males Females Males Females 
       
(1) proportion of females  0.1071*** -0.2316***  0.1717*** -0.0099 
  (0.0368) (0.0298) (0.0567) (0.0567)
(11) (1) + establishment size + industry 0.0717*** -0.3069***  -0.0054 -0.3493*** 
  (0.0301) (0.0333) (0.0424) (0.0467)
(12) (11) + institutional setting 0.0671** -0.2656***  0.0109 -0.3000*** 
  (0.0302) (0.0314) (0.0418) (0.0395)
(13) (12) + achievement potential 0.1829*** -0.0825***  0.0889** -0.1874*** 
  (0.0241) (0.0290) (0.0434) (0.0388)
(14) (13) + workplace characteristics  0.1767*** -0.0816***  0.0804* -0.1901*** 
    (0.0236) (0.0286)  (0.0427) (0.0373)
Number of observations 565,100 192,814   120,985 75,340 
Note:  The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the establishment level. The complete 
estimation results are in Tables C5 – C8. Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: own calculation, LIAB cross-sectional model 2002.   
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